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INTRODUCTION 
The financial system has undergone far-reaching changes since the 
global financial crisis. A new set of regulatory reforms has been 
introduced and their effects are still not adequately evaluated by 
academics and policy-makers. This dissertation takes a step to this 
direction. In the chapters that follow, we shed light on three questions 
related to the regulatory sphere that currently receive much attention by 
policy-makers: the leverage ratio regulation, Emerging Market 
Economies responses to the global financial cycle and a level playing 
field in financial regulation.      
 
The repo market is crucial to the transmission of monetary policy and 
financial stability. It also facilitates the flow cash and securities around 
the financial system and contributes to the efficient allocation of capital 
to the real economy. However, in the wake of the financial crisis, the 
dynamics in the repo market changed considerably. As Durrell Duffie 
argued in the 2016 ECB Forum on Central Banking, the Basel III 
regulatory reforms, most notably the leverage ratio, played an 
important role in this. In Chapter 1, we exploit a novel change in how 
UK regulated banks had to report their leverage ratios to study the 
effect leverage ratio regulation has on repo markets. From January 
2016 onwards the seven largest (stress-tested) UK regulated banks 
became formally subject to a 3 percent leverage ratio which they are 
required to report to the regulator on a quarterly basis. Until January 
2017 these banks could report their leverage ratio based on monthly 
balance sheet averages, after this date reporting was based on daily 
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balance sheet averages. This change reduced the ability of banks to 
window-dress their balance sheet at month-end and therefore 
effectively made the leverage ratio more binding. We show that a 
tightening of the leverage ratio resulting from a change in reporting 
requirements incentivized UK dealers to reduce their repo activity, 
especially affecting small banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
However, the UK gilt repo market showed resilience with foreign, non-
constrained dealers quickly stepping in to partially fill the void. These 
findings suggest that dealer-banks respond to tighter regulation, 
although they do not point to intended or unintended consequences of 
the Basel III regulatory reforms.   
 
In Chapter 2, we examine the transmission channels and side effects on 
the real economy of capital outflow controls as a crisis management 
and financial stability tool. As Helene Rey in her Jackson Hole speech 
in 2013 argued, there is a global financial cycle that affects local credit 
conditions in emerging markets. After nearly a decade, as monetary 
policy in advanced economies begins to normalize and global financial 
conditions tighten, many emerging market economies either adjust 
their FX market operations or explicitly regulate capital outflows. 
While recent evidence suggests that FX market operations mitigate the 
vulnerability of local banks to the global financial cycle, much less is 
known on capital outflows regulation. Analyzing an episode of outflow 
controls in Greece in June 2015, we separate effects on exports arising 
from changes in imported inputs – the trade channel – and external 
financing conditions – the financial channel. We show that the lack of 
3 
 
imported inputs reduced exports at the intensive margin. The 
adjustment was not driven by changes in credit conditions as – in the 
run-up to outflow controls – firms were stockpiling cash reserves out 
of the Greek banking system and in foreign banks – sufficient to cover 
the variable costs of exports – insulating them from the weak local 
banks. However, the cash buffer abroad was only limited to cover the 
large upfront costs of exports that are associated with the extensive 
margin. We show that firms with greater dependence on external 
financing, regardless of their cash reserves strategy, reduced both the 
range of products they exported and the range of destinations they 
served. Overall, our findings suggest that regulating capital outflows 
helps to restore financial stability, but has unintended consequences on 
the real economy that manifest themselves through multiple channels. 
Identifying these channels informs on the policy responses required to 
mitigate the unintended consequences of capital outflow controls. 
Emerging markets should therefore weigh the benefits to financial 
stability against the costs to the real economy of capital outflow 
controls as a crisis management and financial stability tool.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 3, we examine the effect financial globalization has 
on trade integration. Since the outburst of the global financial crisis, a 
large number of studies has documented that local shocks can transmit 
globally because of international financial linkages. However, as 
Maurice Obstfeld discussed in the 13th BIS Annual Conference, 
financial globalization can potentially be a potent source of economic 
benefits. However, as implied by the various theoretical frameworks 
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causality between financial globalization and trade integration can run 
both ways. We exploit quasi-natural experimental variation at the 
country-pair-year level that arises from the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP) of the European Union (EU) in period 1999-2003. FSAP 
was a set of reforms in banking, insurance and securities markets, 
which harmonized EU member states’ financial regulation, integrated 
financial markets and reduced the costs of cross-border financial 
intermediation. Unlike Regulations that imply immediate effect across 
member states, the transposition of EU Directives into national law can 
be slow, often beyond the EU official deadlines. The timing of the 
transposition of the same Directive creates variation in the regulatory 
harmonization of EU financial legislation within a country-pair and 
across years.  Exploiting this variation, we first show that the 
harmonization of financial regulation increases de-facto financial 
integration. The effect is more pronounced when regulatory 
harmonization leaves no discretion to member states over the rules to 
be implemented. This novel result points to the importance of a level 
playing field in financial regulation. Exploiting the de-jure financial 
integration as an exogenous component of de-facto financial 
integration, we find that stronger international financial linkages do not 
increase bilateral trade on aggregate. Instead, industries that are more 
responsive to global shocks (e.g. a global demand shock or an oil 
production shock) trade more at higher levels of financial integration. 
We show that industries trade more at both margins – intensive and 
extensive. Overall, our findings suggest that financial globalization is a 
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key driver of trade integration, but the benefits are not evenly 
distributed across firms and industries.    
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Chapter 1 
 
REPO MARKET FUNCTIONING: THE ROLE OF CAPITAL REGULATION 
 
Joint with Neeltje van Horen 
 
“In the context of evaluating the impact of post-crisis regulatory 
reforms, concerns have been raised that some of the measures 
introduced have had a negative impact on the functioning of repo 
markets. Market analysts and industry associations have argued that 
regulatory reforms have significantly reduced the willingness of banks 
to provide repo services.” 
Financial Stability Review, ECB, November 2017 
1. Introduction  
The market for repurchase agreements (repos) is a critical part of the 
financial system with around 12 trillion dollar of repo and reverse repo 
outstanding globally (CGFS, 2017).1 The market plays a key role in 
facilitating the flow of cash and securities around the financial system, 
benefiting both financial and non-financial firms. By supporting 
liquidity in other markets, it contributes to the efficient allocation of 
capital to the real economy. And, since the Libor scandal, several 
                                               
1 A repo is essentially a secured loan. A dealer sells a debt security, 
usually a government bond, to another party in exchange for cash and 
agrees to repurchase it for an equivalent security at a specified date. 
Reverse repo is the same transaction but seen from the point of view of 
cash lender. 
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central banks have selected benchmark rates based on the repo market.2 
A well-functioning repo market is thus crucial for financial stability 
and for the efficient transmission of monetary policy.  
However, in the wake of the financial crisis, the dynamics in 
the repo market have changed considerably. Liquidity in core repo 
markets has dropped, costs faced by some agents have increased and a 
weakening of repo market functioning has been reported (Bank of 
England, 2016; Duffie, 2016; CGFS, 2017). It is argued that Basel III 
regulatory reforms, most notably the leverage ratio, played an 
important role in this (Duffie, 2016; CGFS, 2017). In the words of 
Jerome Powell “many point to post-crisis regulation as a key factor 
driving any recent decline in liquidity (…) I would agree that it is one 
factor driving recent changes in market making.”3 In this paper we 
show that the leverage ratio indeed affects the repo market, with 
important heterogeneous effects.  
As opposed to the capital ratio, the leverage ratio is a non-risk 
weighted measure that requires banks to hold capital in proportion to 
the overall size of their balance sheet. Due to its non-risk weighted 
nature a binding leverage ratio makes it more costly to engage in low 
                                               
2 Recently the Federal Reserve Bank of New York launched as an 
alternative to the dollar-based Libor a new benchmark rate: the Secured 
Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) based on transactions in the 
Treasury repo market. Switzerland also selected a benchmark rate 
based on the repo market. The Bank of England and Bank of Japan 
selected an unsecured rate as the benchmark alternative to sterling- and 
yen-based Libor.    
3 From his speech on The Evolving Structure of U.S. Treasury Markets 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (October 20, 2015).  
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margin activities.4 This potentially has implications for repo 
intermediation. The margin on repos is low but they expand a bank’s 
balance sheet and therefore attract a capital charge under the leverage 
ratio (Figure 1.1). As a result, the leverage ratio makes engaging in 
repo activities more costly relative to engaging in activities with higher 
margins (but equal capital charge). Banks can hence be expected to 
react to this increase in costs by limiting their repo market activity.  
  
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
 
The empirical identification of the impact of the leverage ratio 
on repo markets is however challenging. First, one needs to find 
plausibly exogenous variation in the leverage ratio that affects some 
                                               
4 For example, assuming a Tier 1 risk-weighted asset (RWA) capital 
ratio requirement of 6 percent and a Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement 
of 3 percent, any asset on the firm’s balance sheet that is risk-weighted 
below 50 percent would attract higher capital requirements under the 
leverage ratio than under the Tier 1 RWA capital requirements.   
Figure 1.1: Leverage Ratio and Repo Market 
 
Figure 2.1: Leverage Ratio and Repo Market 
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key participants in the repo market but not all of them. Second, the 
shock should not coincide with other factors affecting repo markets. 
Third, one needs to convincingly isolate the adjustment in supply from 
that driven by demand.  
In this paper we address all three empirical challenges by, for 
the first time, exploiting a policy change that took place in the UK, one 
of the world’s core repo markets. On January 2017, the Bank of 
England changed the way in which UK regulated banks had to report 
their leverage ratio (Bank of England, 2015a,b). 5 From January 2016 
onwards the seven largest (stress-tested) UK regulated banks became 
formally subject to a 3 percent leverage ratio which they were required 
to report to the regulator on a quarterly basis.6 During a transitional 
period of 12 months, reporting banks could measure their on-balance 
sheet assets on the last day of each month and take the average over the 
quarter (“monthly averaging”). From January 2017 onwards, the on-
balance sheet assets had to be measured on each day (“daily 
averaging”). Both the capital measure as well as the off-balance sheet 
assets continued to be measured at month-end. This switch from 
monthly to daily averaging in relation to on-balance sheet assets 
                                               
5 The leverage ratio is defined as a bank’s Tier 1 capital divided by its 
total exposure measure which consists of the bank’s total on-balance 
sheet assets and certain off-balance sheet exposures.  
6 These are Barclays, HSBC, Nationwide, Lloyds, RBS, Santander and 
Standard Chartered.  
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reduced the ability of banks to window-dress their balance sheet at 
period-ends and effectively made the leverage ratio more binding.7 8  
The change in reporting requirement of the leverage ratio 
affected four dealers in the gilt repo market, but not the remaining 12 
dealers, providing us with a natural treatment and control group.9 
Furthermore, the change did not coincide with any other regulatory 
change or adjustment in (unconventional) monetary policy in the UK 
potentially affecting repo markets. In addition, even though the change 
in reporting was already announced in November 2015, affected banks 
had no incentive to adjust their behaviour prior to the actual change in 
January 2017. Finally, all UK dealers had an incentive to adjust their 
repo activity even when not close to the regulatory constraint in order 
to avoid the market reacting to a change in their leverage ratio.   
                                               
7 Recently repo markets have been characterized by volatilities in 
prices and volumes over period ends (quarter-ends and year-ends) as 
banks are reducing the size or improving the composition of their 
balance sheets at these times. Regulatory constraints, such as the 
leverage ratio, have been identified as one of the drivers behind 
window-dressing behavior of European dealers (Anbil and Senyuz, 
2018). Munyan (2015) shows that unlike non-US dealers, US dealers 
had no incentive to engage in window-dressing as they report capital 
ratios based on daily averaging.  
8 See also ICMA European repo and collateral council report (February 
2017) which argues that daily averaging reduces overall balance sheet 
capacity throughout the year. In other words, the shock we exploit is 
expected to work through the leverage ratio constraint.  
9 The affected dealers are Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and Santander. The 
unaffected dealers are Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, BNP Paribas, 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan 
Stanley, Nomura, RBC, Scotiabank, TD Bank and UBS.  
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These features make it an ideal quasi-natural experiment to 
study if and how capital regulation affects repo market functioning. 
And, as is apparent from the top panel of Figure 1.2, the four dealers 
affected by the regulatory change indeed reacted strongly. The graph 
depicts the evolution of the (standardized) total repo volume 
intermediated by these dealers over the period October 2016 to 
February 2017. During the period of “monthly averaging” they reduced 
repo volumes at each month-end, in line with window-dressing 
behaviour. After the move to “daily averaging” we do not observe such 
behaviour anymore, indicating that the leverage ratio effectively 
became more binding. As expected, the non-affected dealers did not 
change their behaviour (Figure 1.2, bottom panel). 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 1.2: Daily Repo Volume by Affected and Non-Affected Dealers 
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Exploiting this intensification of the leverage ratio, we assess 
how dealers adjusted their repo intermediation in the bilateral dealer-
client repo market. We focus on this segment of the market for a 
number of reasons. First, it allows us to study how the leverage ratio 
affects the ability of end-users such as banks, insurers, pension funds, 
hedge funds and asset managers, to invest their cash low risk and to 
have access to government securities. Due to lack of detailed data, this 
part of the repo market has hitherto received very little attention. 
However it is a critical part of the market capturing almost 70 percent 
of total transaction volume in the UK and about 50 percent in the US.10 
As such, understanding the precise impact of capital regulation on this 
segment of the market is essential and complements the literature 
studying its impact on the US tri-party repo market (e.g. Munyan, 
2015; Allahrakha, Cettina and Munyan, 2016; Anbil and Senyuz, 
2018). Second, it provides us with the unique opportunity to examine 
how the leverage ratio affects a diverse set of repo market end-users 
depending on their size, relationship with the dealer and sector. Third, 
the impact of the leverage ratio is expected to be more pronounced in 
this segment as these trades are not cleared via a Central Clearing Party 
(CCP) which reduces the ability of banks to net out a repo with a 
                                               
10 To the best of our knowledge, the UK is the only core repo market 
which has data available capturing the universe of bilateral repo 
transactions. In 2014, the Office of Financial Research and the Federal 
Reserve System launched a voluntary pilot data collection focused on 
the US bilateral repo market, but comprehensive data is still lacking 
(Baklanova, Caglio, Cipriani and Copeland, 2016).   
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reverse repo transaction and as such avoid a capital charge.11 Not 
surprisingly, there are ample signs of a reduced willingness of banks to 
use their balance sheet for repo especially affecting end-users in the 
market (CGFS, 2017). 
We employ a new database, the Sterling Money Market 
Database (SMMD), which contains supervisory transaction-level data 
covering the near-universe of gilt repo transactions and it has two 
unique advantages. First, besides detailed information on the volume, 
pricing and collateral used in each transaction, the database importantly 
includes both the reporting dealer (the cash borrower) and the 
counterparty (the cash lender). This enables us to compare adjustments 
in repo intermediation at the dealer-client level allowing for a much 
tighter identification. Furthermore, as we know each counterparty, we 
are able to study whether the leverage ratio affects different clients 
differently. Second, the database clearly identifies each gilt repo 
transaction. As such, we do not have to rely on a matching algorithm 
along the lines of Furfine (1999) in order to isolate gilt repo 
transactions from other transactions and to identify both sides of the 
                                               
11 A bank can net out its repo with a reverse repo transaction when it 
involves transactions to the same counterparty, with the same maturity 
date and conducted in the same settlement system. This repo 
transaction then does not count towards the balance sheet anymore and 
therefore lowers the bank’s leverage ratio. Transactions via the CCP 
are considered transactions to the same counterparty and therefore 
much more likely to be eligible for netting. In the UK the vast majority 
of interdealer trades are cleared by a CCP.   
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transaction.12 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
studying the heterogeneous effects of capital regulation on repo 
markets. 
In a standard difference-in-differences setting, we compare 
repo intermediation within dealer-client pairs before and after the 
policy shock differentiating between affected dealers (treatment group) 
and non-affected dealers (control group). For identification purposes, 
we focus on clients with at least two dealers and control for observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity in repo demand and credit risk by 
employing client fixed effects (Kwaja and Mian, 2008). In other words, 
for the same client, we compare the differential adjustment in repo 
volumes by affected and non-affected dealers.  
Our main results are as follows. First, we find that dealers 
affected by the leverage ratio on average reduced repo volume (i.e. 
accepted less cash) from their clients relative to non-affected dealers. 
Critically, this result holds when controlling for changes in demand 
and credit risk at the client level. The economic magnitude of this 
change is substantial. On average, affected dealers accept 66 
percentage points less repo volumes compared to non-affected dealers 
                                               
12 When using datasets such as Target2 and Fedwire, the use of 
algorithms is necessary so the output includes transactions that do not 
represent transactions that are of interest to the researcher or may 
discard transactions that should be included and these types of errors 
can be large (Armantier and Copeland, 2012).  
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from the same client in the period after the policy change compared to 
the period before. 13 
This effect, however, hides some important heterogeneous 
effects. Motivated by the CGFS (2017) report on repo market  
functioning, we first differentiate between small and large clients (as 
measured by their total repo activity in the period prior to the 
regulatory change) and find that dealer banks subject to the regulatory 
change reduced repo volume more to their smaller clients compared to 
their larger clients, relative to non-affected dealers. These results hold 
when controlling for demand and concurrent factors potentially 
affecting individual dealers. We also find that dealers tend to move 
away from clients with whom they have a weaker relationship; 
however the impact of size dominates. We do not find a differential 
effect for clients with more long-term repos, that tend to be cash 
borrowers or that are foreign.    
Economic effects are large with affected dealers 
intermediating on average 133 percentage points lower repo volumes 
from their small relative to their large clients compared to non-affected 
dealers.14 We show that this differential behavior is persistent, 
consistent with the manifestation of a permanent change in repo market 
intermediation. Furthermore, affected dealers were not behaving 
                                               
13 This magnitude reflects the combined effect of affected dealers 
reducing repo volume they accept from their clients and the non-
affected dealers increasing it.  
14 This magnitude again reflects the combined effect of affected dealers 
reducing the repo volume they accept from their small clients relative 
to their large clients, while non-affected dealers are increasing theirs.  
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differently prior to the regulatory change reducing concerns that our 
results are driven by different pre-event trends between the two types 
of dealers.  
When examining the impact on the extensive margin and 
other loan terms, we document a (persistent) reduction in the frequency 
of transactions and a reduction in repo rates that affected dealers are 
willing to offer to their (small) clients. We do not find an adjustment in 
haircuts or maturities. These findings are as expected as the 
intensification of the leverage ratio should only affect volumes and 
prices. Bigger haircuts reflect a worsening of the quality of the 
underlying collateral and maturities mainly relate to a client’s business 
model, so both should not be affected by the intensification of the 
leverage ratio.15  
The heterogeneous effects we document are in line with 
evidence gathered from market participants (CGFS, 2017) and puts 
rigor to the causal interpretation of our findings. As interactions with 
large clients are much more frequent, profit margins and franchise 
value tend to be higher. In addition, larger clients more likely provide 
ancillary business which justifies use of balance sheet and have more 
negotiating power over the contract terms. Finally, with larger clients it 
is more likely that a dealer can net out a repo with a reverse repo 
transaction which implies that the transaction does not count towards 
the balance sheet. As such, dealer banks are expected to adjust their 
                                               
15 Our non-result is in line with the notion that collateral and maturity 
are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems (e.g. Ortiz-
Molina and Penas, 2008). 
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repo intermediation to small relative to large clients, in line with our 
findings.  
In the final section of the paper we investigate the aggregate 
effect and repo substitution. A conservative back of the envelope 
calculation suggests that, keeping all else equal and not allowing for 
the possibility of substitution, the withdrawal of affected dealers 
resulted in small clients being able to place 32 percent, equaling 2.9 
billion pounds, less cash in the gilt repo market. However, we find 
evidence that this is partially offset by non-affected dealers increasing 
their repo activity to these clients. This was primarily done through an 
intensification of pre-existing relationships, rather than through the 
establishment of new ones. In line with this, non-affected dealers 
increased their market share to small clients from 39 to 49 percent after 
the regulatory change. These results indicate that competing, non-
constrained, foreign dealers took the opportunity to capture market 
share when affected, UK dealers withdrew from the small end-user 
segment of the dealer-client market. The market therefore seems to 
have been resilient and adjusted quickly.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next 
section provides a review of the literature. In Section 3 we describe in 
more detail the gilt repo market and how the leverage ratio affects repo 
market intermediation. Section 4 outlines our empirical methodology 
and describes the SMM database that we exploit. Section 5 presents 
and discusses our empirical findings and Section 6 analyses the 
aggregate effect and market adjustment. Section 7 concludes and 
discusses the policy implications of our findings.  
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2. Related literature  
Our paper contributes to and combines two main strands of the 
literature. First, it contributes to the literature that studies the repo 
market. Most recent studies have focused on the functioning of the US 
repo market around the global financial crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 
2012; Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, 2014 ; Copeland, Martin, and 
Walker, 2014) or the European repo market around the sovereign debt 
crisis (Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer, 2016; Boissel, Derrien, 
Ors and Thesmar, 2017), broadly concluding that both markets resisted 
the stress fairly well with no significant decline in volumes but with 
some increases in haircuts.  
A more nascent part of this literature focuses explicitly on 
how regulation affects repo markets. Studying the US tri-party repo 
market Munyan (2015) and Anbil and Senyuz (2018) provide evidence 
that indicates that non-US banks reduce their repo activity around 
financial reporting dates to appear better capitalized.16 Allahrakha, 
Cettina and Munyan (2016) document a number of changes in the US 
tri-party repo market after the announcement of the leverage ratio in 
the US, such as a reduction in borrowing, an increase in use of more 
                                               
16 A related literature studies window-dressing behavior in other 
markets. Du, Tepper and Verdelhan (2018) document covered interest 
rate parity violations at quarter-ends indicating that post-crisis 
regulation drives a wedge between supply and demand due to costly 
financial intermediation. Abbassi, Iyer, Peydro and Soto (2017) find 
that after the ECB’s announcement of its asset quality review, 
reviewed banks decreased their share of riskier securities and loans and 
the level of overall securities and credit supply.  
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volatile collateral and a shift towards non-bank dealers. Using a sample 
of European banks, Baldo, Bucalossi and Scalia (2018) show that repo 
activity outside the leverage ratio reporting dates has not decreased. 
Focusing primarily on the interdealer segment of the gilt repo market, 
Bicu, Chen and Elliott (2017) find no statistically significant evidence 
of a reduction in repo liquidity after the announcement of the leverage 
ratio in the UK.   
Our work extends this literature in several ways. First, we 
explicitly focus on the dealer-client segment of the repo market, which 
hitherto received very little attention due to unavailability of data. As 
this is a major segment of the repo market (more than 70 percent in the 
UK), understanding its functioning is essential. Second, in contrast to 
the above literature, the quasi-natural experiment that we exploit in 
combination with detailed transaction level data allows us to address 
the empirical challenges that one faces when isolating the impact of the 
leverage ratio from other confounding factors and to isolate demand 
from supply. This enables us to make a clean assessment of the causal 
impact of the leverage ratio on repo market functioning. Third, the data 
allow us to examine how capital regulation affects different clients and 
therefore to uncover heterogeneous effects. 
Second, our paper contributes to the literature that studies the 
consequences of capital regulation. Not surprisingly, given its early 
introduction, most of this literature has focused on the impact of 
changes in the capital ratio, showing that an increase in capital 
requirements (or cost) leads banks to contract lending (see among 
others, Berger and Udell, 1994; Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko 
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and Wieladek, 2014; Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina, 2017) with 
important negative real effects on firms (Gropp, Mosk, Ongena and 
Wix, 2018) and that it induces credit re-allocation towards non-bank 
financial intermediation (Irani, Iyer, Meisenzahl and Peydro, 2018).   
 While the leverage ratio has received a lot of press coverage 
and is discussed extensively in policy debates, the academic literature 
on its impact is still relatively scarce. However it is growing rapidly. 
Adrian, Boyarchenko and Shachar (2017) find evidence that indicates 
that leverage regulation leads to a reduction in bond liquidity. Acosta 
Smith, Grill and Lang (2017) and Choi, Holcomb and Morgan (2018) 
show that the leverage ratio incentivizes banks to shift their portfolio to 
riskier assets but does not increase overall bank risk. Furthermore, 
recent research shows that the leverage ratio discourages dealers to 
engage in FX trading activity (Cendese, Della Corte and Wang, 2018) 
reduces their willingness to clear derivatives on behalf of clients 
(Acosta Smith, Ferrara and Rodriguez-Tous, 2018) and to participate in 
spread-narrowing trades (Boyarchenko, Eisenback, Gupta, Shachar and 
Van Tassel, 2018). We add to this literature by showing that the 
leverage ratio affects repo market functioning with dealers moving 
away from smaller end-users when the leverage ratio becomes more 
binding.   
  
3. Leverage ratio and repo market intermediation  
This section describes the functioning of the gilt repo market in the UK 
and then discusses how the leverage ratio in general and the change in 
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the reporting requirement in particular affect the repo market 
functioning.  
 
3.1  Gilt repo market 
Formally, a repo is a “repurchase agreement”: an agreement to sell 
securities (referred to as collateral) at a given price to a counterparty 
with the commitment to repurchase the same (or similar) security at a 
specified future date for a specified price. The difference between the 
price at which the security is sold and repurchased reflects an 
annualized interest rate known as the repo rate. From the point of view 
of the cash borrower the transaction is referred to as repo, while from 
the point of view of the cash lender it is referred to as reverse repo. A 
repo transaction is economically equivalent to a secured loan since the 
securities provide credit protection in the event that the seller (i.e. the 
cash borrower) is unable to complete the second leg of the transaction. 
Collateral haircuts and regular margin payments further protect the 
lender against fluctuations in the value of the collateral. The majority 
of repo transactions are overnight transactions; however a substantial 
share consists of maturities ranging from a couple of days to a number 
of months.  
Repo markets play a key role in facilitating the flow of cash 
and securities around the financial system. They create and support 
opportunities for the low-risk investment of cash, as well as efficient 
management of liquidity and collateral by financial and non-financial 
firms. The repo market supports the smooth functioning of derivatives 
markets as it provides market participants with means to obtain high-
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quality collateral that can be used as margin. Movements in short-term 
repo rates change the market-based financing conditions for banks and 
hence their conditions for trading with firms and households. This 
means that repo rates are a prime channel through which changes in the 
monetary policy stance are transmitted to the broader financial system 
and the real economy. The repo market is therefore key to the short-
term liquidity needs of banks and non-bank financial institutions and a 
cornerstone of the transmission of monetary policy.  
Although the precise structure of the repo market varies across 
jurisdictions, there are two segments: the dealer-to-dealer (interdealer) 
and the dealer-to-client segment (dealer-client). In the interdealer 
market, dealers transact to finance their market-making inventory, 
source short-term funding or invest their cash and they transact on 
behalf of their clients. In the dealer-client segment, end-users meet 
with dealers to provide collateral in return for cash (e.g. asset 
managers, pension funds, hedge funds and insurance companies) or to 
invest in cash while receiving collateral (e.g money market funds or 
corporate treasurers). Banks in addition use reverse repo to borrow 
gilts for their liquid asset buffers.  
Trades can be settled in three ways: bilateral, triparty and via 
a Central Clearing Party (CCP). The difference between bilateral and 
triparty repo is that in the latter market a third party called a clearing 
bank acts as an intermediary and alleviates the administrative burden 
between two parties engaging in a repo. The clearing bank does not 
assume the credit risk of the counterparties in the transaction. When 
trades are settled through a CCP the CCP acts as the clearing bank but 
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also assumes the credit risk by becoming the buyer to all sellers and the 
seller to all buyers. Only members of the CCP can trade through the 
CCP. As CCP membership is expensive it is typically limited to large 
banks and dealers. 
In the UK the vast majority of interdealer transactions are 
cleared by a CCP and this accounts for close to 30 percent of all repo 
transaction volume. The dealer-client segment is almost entirely settled 
bilaterally and captures almost 70 percent of total transaction volume. 
Only a tiny segment of the UK repo market is settled on tri-party basis 
(less than 5 percent). In contrast, half of the dealer-client segment of 
the US repo market segment is settled bilaterally and half is settled tri-
party via a clearing bank, such as the Bank of New York Mellon and 
JP Morgan Chase (Baklanova, Dalton and Tompaidis, 2017).  
The vast majority of sterling-denominated repo involves the 
sale and repurchase of gilts (UK government bonds) issued by the UK 
Debt Management Office (DMO). Around the policy shock there were 
16 dealer banks active in the market. These are Bank of America-
Merrill Lynch, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, 
Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Lloyds, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, 
RBC, Santander, Scotiabank, TD Bank and UBS.17 As of mid-2016,  
there was about 900 billion USD repo and reverse repo collateralized 
by gilts outstanding, which makes the UK the fourth largest repo 
market (after the Euro area, US and Japan) (CGFS, 2017).  
                                               
17 There are also two non-bank dealers active, but we do not include 
them in the analysis.  
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3.2  Leverage ratio 
In the wake of the global financial crisis the Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) undertook a significant program of 
reform to banking regulation known as Basel III. The reform 
introduced new international regulatory standards for both 
capitalization and liquidity risk management. One of the key regulatory 
reforms was the introduction of the leverage ratio. As opposed to the 
capital ratio, the leverage ratio is a non-risk weighted measure that 
requires banks to hold capital in proportion to the exposure measure 
(including both on-balance sheet exposures and some off-balance sheet 
items). The requirement constrains leverage in the banking sector and 
thus helps to mitigate the risk of destabilizing deleveraging processes. 
Furthermore, as it is independent of risk, the leverage ratio provides a 
safeguard against model risk and measurement error which affects the 
capital ratio.  
 However, because of its non-risk weighted nature the leverage 
ratio effectively makes it more costly for banks to engage in low 
margin activities. This potentially has implications for repo 
intermediation as the margin on repos is low but they expand a bank’s 
balance sheet and therefore attract a capital charge under the leverage 
ratio (Figure 1). As a result, the leverage ratio makes it effectively 
more costly for banks to assign balance sheet to repos relative to assets 
with higher margins (but equal capital charge). Banks can hence be 
expected to react to this increase in cost by limiting their repo activity. 
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The BCBS first indicated that it planned to introduce a 
leverage ratio in a consultation document in 2009 and proposed a 3 
percent target in 2010 (BCBS, 2009 and 2010). At this time it also 
proposed a transition path to implementation whereby banks would be 
required to publicly disclose their leverage ratios starting in January 
2015. In 2014, the BCBS finalized the definition of the leverage ratio 
and reiterated that the leverage ratio would become a Pillar 1 
requirement from 2018 onwards (BCBS, 2014).  
The way domestic regulators have implemented the leverage 
ratio varies across jurisdictions. UK authorities have implemented the 
leverage ratio earlier than the Basel and EU timelines. The seven 
largest UK banks (those subject to regulatory stress-tests) have been 
expected to meet a 3 percent leverage ratio since January 2014 (Bank 
of England, 2013). End 2015 the UK leverage ratio framework was 
announced, stipulating a 3 percent minimum requirement for the seven 
banks (Barclays, HSBC, Nationwide, Lloyds, RBS, Santander and 
Standard Chartered) starting in January 2016 (Bank of England, 
2015a,b). Other UK regulated banks (smaller domestic banks and 
foreign subsidiaries other than Santander) will become subject to a 3 
percent minimum requirement under CRD IV to be implemented after 
2019.  For a detailed timeline of the implementation of the leverage 
ratio in the UK see Appendix Table 1. 18  
  
                                               
18 For a further description of how UK authorities implemented the 
leverage ratio see Bicu, Chen and Elliott (2017)  
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4. Empirical methodology and data 
In order to examine how the leverage ratio affects repo intermediation 
in the bilateral dealer-client market, we exploit a regulatory change in 
the UK which modified the way banks had to report their leverage 
ratio. This policy change affected some dealers in the UK sterling 
money market but left the other dealers unaffected and, thus, provides 
us with an ideal quasi-natural experiment.  
 As of January 2016 four dealers in the gilt repo market, 
Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and Santander, became formally subject to a 3 
percent leverage ratio which has to be reported on a quarterly basis. 
During a transitional period of 12 months the reporting banks could 
measure their on-balance sheet assets on the last day of each month and 
take the average over the quarter (“monthly averaging”). From January 
2017 onwards the on-balance sheet assets had to be measured on each 
day (“daily averaging”). This switch from monthly to daily average 
reporting reduced the ability of banks to window-dress their balance 
sheet and effectively made the leverage ratio more binding. The 
remaining 12 dealers did not have to report their leverage ratio to the 
Bank of England and as such were not subject to the change in this 
requirement providing us with a natural treatment and control group.19    
                                               
19 These dealers are headquartered in the EU, US and Canada and 
therefore (also) subject to regulation in their home markets. The US 
implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio is the supplementary 
leverage ratio that requires certain banks to hold tier 1 capital 
equivalent to 3 percent of total exposures. US banks that are subject to 
the supplementary leverage ratio began disclosing and reporting their 
ratios in 2015, and must be in compliance by 2018. In addition, an 
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Figure 2 shows that the change in reporting requirements 
indeed affected the behavior of the UK regulated dealers. It depicts the 
evolution of the (standardized) total repo volume intermediated by UK 
regulated (top panel) and non-UK regulated (bottom panel) dealers 
over the period October 2016 to February 2017. As the graph shows, 
prior to the regulatory change the UK regulated dealers substantially 
reduced their repo volumes around month-ends, while non-UK 
regulated dealers did not. After the regulatory change the volume 
reductions were much less pronounced and more in line with the 
behavior of non-UK regulated dealers. These patterns show that 
“monthly averaging” incentivized UK regulated dealers to window-
dress their balance sheet, which after the regulatory change was not 
beneficial anymore.  
The change in regulatory reporting provides us with plausibly 
exogenous variation in the intensification of the leverage ratio in order 
to assess its impact on repo intermediation. Using the change in 
reporting requirements instead of the introduction of the leverage ratio 
is useful for several reasons. First, the policy shock is much cleaner 
compared to the introduction of the leverage ratio itself. The UK 
regulatory authorities announced the implementation of the leverage 
                                                                                             
enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) will come into effect in 
2018 and requires G-SIBs and insured depository institutions of G-
SIBs to meet a 5 percent and 6 percent minimum leverage ratio, 
respectively. Canadian banks have to maintain a leverage ratio that 
meets or exceeds 3 percent at all times since January 2015. European 
banks have to disclose their leverage ratio since 2015 but do not have 
to meet a 3 percent minimum as part of their Pilar 1 capital 
requirements. 
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ratio ahead of time specifically to give banks time to gradually adjust 
their balance sheet. Therefore it is hard to contribute changes in the 
repo market to the introduction of the leverage ratio. The change in 
reporting requirement that we exploit was also announced ahead of its 
actual implementation (at the end of 2015), however dealers did not 
have an incentive to change their behaviour ahead of the 
implementation date. The vast majority of repo transactions are very 
short-term, so dealers do not have to adjust their repo rates or volumes 
until the daily average requirement comes into effect. This makes it 
possible to isolate the impact of the leverage ratio on repo 
intermediation from other confounding factors. Furthermore, all UK 
dealers had an incentive to adjust their repo activity even without a 
binding leverage in order to avoid the market reacting to a change in 
their leverage ratio. Finally, and crucial for our identification, the 
change in regulation did not coincide with any other regulatory 
changes or changes in (unconventional) monetary policy in the UK that 
could affect repo market intermediation. As such, the reporting change 
provides us with a suitable exogenous policy shock that affects some 
dealers in the gilt repo market, while leaving others unaffected.  
 
4.1 Identification strategy  
We want to assess how the leverage ratio affects the ability of end-
users such as banks, insurers, pension funds, hedge funds and asset 
managers, to invest their cash low risk and to have easy access to 
government securities. Having identified exogenous variation in the 
intensification of the leverage ratio allows us to perform a difference-
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in-differences analysis in which we compare repo intermediation 
within dealer-client pair before and after the policy shock 
differentiating between dealers affected and not affected by the shock.  
We compare the behaviour of the two types of dealers in the 
month before and after the regulatory change. To avoid any bias from 
increased volatility resulting from dealers’ practices to window-dress 
and adjust their balance sheets at year-end, we drop the last two 
business weeks of December 2016 and the first business days of 
January 2017 (see Figure 2). 20 We ensure that both the pre and post 
periods have the same number of week days as to assure that results are 
not driven by different activity on certain days of the week. As such, 
our pre period ranges from November 21 to December 16, 2016 and 
the post period ranges from January 5 to February 1, 2017 (i.e. 4 
business weeks each). We use a relatively short period of time for two 
reasons. One, this market is very different from the corporate loan 
market: it is very short term, often overnight, and clients tend to use the 
market repeatedly during a short time window. Second, as the market 
is affected by unconventional monetary policy and (changes in) other 
regulatory requirements (CGFS, 2017), the longer the time window 
around the event the more likely confounding factors will affect the 
estimates. However, we show that our results remain robust when we 
consider alternative time windows.  
                                               
20 At year end both types of dealers significantly reduce their repo 
volumes as banks reduce the size or improve the composition of their 
balance sheets because of regulatory constraints such as the leverage 
ratio, the G-SIB surcharge and the SRF levy, and because of 
commercial and taxation consideration (CGFS, 2017). 
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We analyse the same dealer-client pair before and after the 
policy shock. However, it is crucial to also control for changes in 
demand and risk at the client level. Therefore we focus on clients that 
were placing cash in the pre-period with at least 2 different dealers and 
continue to transact with them in the post period.21 This allows us to 
saturate the specification with client fixed effects and to control for 
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in client fundamentals 
(demand, quality and risk). In other words, for the same client, we 
compare the differential adjustment in repo intermediation by affected 
and non-affected dealers (Khwaja and Mian, 2008).  
 
4.2 Data  
We use a new regulatory database called the Sterling Money Market 
Database (SMMD). The aim of this data collection is to secure and 
improve information available to the Bank of England on conditions in 
the sterling money market to help the Bank meet its monetary policy 
and financial stability objectives. The database contains virtually all 
transactions, from overnight to one year, conducted in the secured and 
unsecured sterling money market as reported by the 23 most active 
participants in the market (this captures about 95 percent of the total 
market).22 The transactions include both repos and reverse repos 
                                               
21 Clients with only one dealer represent <1 percent of total repo 
volume in our sample. 
22 The data that are available from 1 February 2016 contain a subset of 
‘early adopters’, comprising roughly 80 percent of the full population. 
The full reporting population is contributing since 1 July 2016. This 
full population of reporters is chosen to cover 95 percent of the volume 
of activity in the sterling money market, and may be expected to 
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secured against gilts and known as gilt repo. The database includes 
transactions in both the interdealer and the dealer-client repo market, 
but we focus exclusively on the latter segment of the market. We have 
access to five months of data: October 2016 – February 2017.  
 The SMM database has two unique advantages. First, besides 
detailed information on the volume, pricing and collateral used in each 
transaction, the database importantly includes both the reporting dealer 
(the cash borrower) and the counterparty (the cash lender). This allows 
us to effectively compare adjustments in repo intermediation within 
dealer-client pairs and to examine in detail differential adjustments 
across client types. Second, as the database clearly identifies gilt repo 
transactions, we do not have to rely on a matching algorithm along the 
lines of Furfine (1999) in order to isolate the gilt repo transactions from 
other transactions and to identify both sides of the transaction, a 
procedure that is necessary when using transaction level datasets such 
as Target2 and Fedwire. As such we can say with certainty that all 
transactions we capture are indeed gilt repo transactions, that we do not 
wrongly exclude repo transactions from any of the reporting banks and 
that the party identified as the cash lender is indeed the correct 
counterparty.  
We clean the data in a number of ways. First, while there are 
23 reporting entities, only 16 of those are dealers in the repo market. 
As the dealers are the biggest intermediaries we capture the vast 
                                                                                             
change over time to remain in line with this aim. For more information 
on the scope of and process for reporting, see 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Documents/reporters/defs/instruct
ions_smm.pdf. 
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majority of trades (>95% in terms of repo volumes). Second, we are 
only interested in clients that are banks or non-bank financial 
institutions, such as pension funds, hedge funds and insurance 
companies, and therefore we drop all repo transactions involving non-
financial corporates. In addition, we drop dealer-client transactions in 
which the client is another dealer (interdealer transactions), a State, a 
Central Bank or a trust, because of different business models. Third, 
for most transactions counterparties are reported using either their 
unique legal entity identifier (LEI) or their name (for about 70 percent 
of the transactions the LEI is provided). However, in a few instances 
(<10 percent of total transactions), due to privacy laws, only the sector 
of the counterparty is provided. As our identification relies on changes 
in repo intermediation at the dealer-client level, we cannot include 
transactions for which the counterparty name is not available, hence we 
drop these.23 We further drop transactions with variable rate, pool or 
multiple collateral and tri-party repo transactions.24  
As counterparty names are provided at the legal entity level, 
different funds of the same asset manager are reported as different 
counterparties. Although a laborious task, we manually aggregate these 
different legal entities into a parent company and use this as the client 
in our model.25 We take this approach as credit risk, reputation and size 
                                               
23 This mainly affects transactions reported from institutions based in 
France.  
24 Transactions with these characteristics represent less than 5 percent 
of total transactions. 
25 A similar consolidation procedure is applied by the Office of 
Financial Research in the U.S. Money Market Fund Monitor data. 
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of the parent company will ultimately determine to what extent a dealer 
will adjust its repo activity. Furthermore, focusing on the parent 
company avoids classifying the same legal entity as different 
counterparties because different dealers use different reporting 
conventions.  
In order to control for demand and changes in credit risk we 
only include clients that were placing cash with at least two different 
dealers and who continue to transact with these dealers in the post 
period. Our final sample therefore contains 15 dealers, 38 clients and 
126 dealer-client pairs. On average a client interacts with 3 different 
dealers, but the number of dealers a client interacts with ranges from 2 
to 10. Over 80 percent of the dealer-client pairs involve clients that are 
non-bank financial institutions, with the largest groups being hedge 
funds and asset managers.  
In the period preceding the change in reporting requirements 
4,218 repo transactions worth 306 billion pounds took place between 
our group of dealers and clients. Of those 75 percent were overnight, 
13 percent had a maturity of one week and 11 percent of more than one 
week. On average a dealer-client pair interacted 33 times. The affected 
dealers accounted for 31 percent of total repo volume accepted.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Baseline effect  
In order to examine the impact of the exogenous intensification of the 
leverage ratio on repo intermediation we estimate the following model: 
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∆"#$	('#"()*),- = /0 × 233*45*6	7*8"*9, + /; × <*"85=#>?ℎ=A,-+ B- + C,-  
 
where ∆"#$	('#"()*),-  is the pre-post change in the (log of) the total 
repo volume accepted by dealer i from client j, with pre={November 
21-December 16} and post={January 05-February 01}. We aggregate 
the daily transactions between a dealer-client pair before and after the 
regulatory change because most clients do not trade every day. Also, 
this way we eliminate concerns of estimation bias due to serial 
correlation. The variable is winsorized at the 1 and 99th percentile.  233*45*6	7*8"*9, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the dealer was 
subject to the UK leverage ratio at the time of the policy change, and to 
0 otherwise; <*"85=#>?ℎ=A,- is defined as the pre-determined ratio of 
frequency of repo transactions between dealer i and client j to total 
number of repo transactions of dealer i 26; B-	is a vector of client fixed 
effects; and C,-  is the error term. The model is estimated using OLS 
and, in addition, we cluster standard errors at the dealer level. We 
choose this level of clustering because the coefficient of interest varies 
at the dealer level, as well as to account for the fact that changes in 
repo volumes are likely correlated within dealer. Appendix Table A.2 
                                               
26 We use the definition of relationship strength put forward by 
Petersen and Rajan (1994). For robustness, we construct an alternative 
measure of relationship between dealer-client pair, defined as the pre-
determined ratio of volume of repo transactions between dealer-client 
to total volume of repo transactions of dealer (e.g. Afonso, Kovner and 
Schoar, 2011). Our conclusions remain unchanged when we employ 
the alternative measure.  
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shows the definition and summary statistics of all variables used 
throughout the paper.  
Our coefficient of interest is /0. A negative coefficient for /0 
would imply that—all else equal—affected dealers intermediate lower 
repo volumes after the policy change, compared to non-affected 
dealers. Put differently, the numerical estimate of β0 captures the 
difference in adjustment of repo market intermediation induced by 
switching from the control group to the treatment group. The cross-
section specification in first differences eliminates any time-invariant 
(un)observed heterogeneity at the dealer, client and dealer-client pair 
level as well as shocks common to all clients and dealers. The 
relationship measure controls for the importance of the client in the 
dealer’s portfolio before the regulatory change. In our preferred 
specification we also include client fixed effects to allow us to control 
for (un)observed heterogeneity in changes in client demand, quality 
and risk. As such, we isolate the impact of the change in the reporting 
requirement of the leverage ratio on repo intermediation by comparing 
the change in repo volumes accepted by the same client from affected 
vis-à-vis non-affected dealers.  
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Table 1.1: Leverage Ratio and Repo 
 
The result in Table 1.1, column (1) indicates that dealers 
affected by the leverage ratio on average reduced the repo volume they 
were willing to accept from their clients relative to non-affected dealers 
(significant at the 5 percent level). Without controlling for demand we 
find that after the regulatory change affected dealers on average reduce 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Affected Dealer -0.404** -0.431** -0.446* -0.664*
0.179 0.174 0.231 0.312
Relationship -0.767 -1.074 -1.705
0.993 1.056 1.276
Constant 0.137 0.159
0.113 0.108
Client's Sector FE no no yes no
Client FE no no no yes
N 126 126 126 126
R2 0.027 0.031 0.065 0.333
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. Daily transactions
are collapsed before and after the regulatory change using a time window of
one month, where Pre={November 21-December 16} and Post={January 05-
February 01}. Δlog(Volume) is defined as the pre-post change in the (log
of) the total repo volume accepted by dealer i from client j and is winsorized
at 1 and 99 percentiles. Relationship is a (demeaned) pre-determined
continuous variable, defined as the ratio of frequency of repo transactions
between dealer- client pair to total number of repo transactions of the dealer.
Standard errors allow for correlation at the dealer level.
Δlog(Volume)
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repo volume they accept by 27 percent, while non-affected dealers on 
average increase it by 14 percent. In column (2) we control for the 
strength of the pre-shock relationship between dealer and client. We 
find no evidence that the strength of the relationship has an impact on 
the change in repo volume accepted.  
One could be concerned that some of the clients placing cash 
at affected banks have a lesser need to place cash or experienced and 
increase in credit risk after the change in reporting requirement, 
relative to clients from non-affected banks. If this was the case, the 
reduction in repo volume instead of a supply side reaction by dealers, 
would be driven by lower demand and/or quality of the client. To 
address this concern, we first add sector fixed effects to control for 
changes in demand that are sector driven (column 3). Controlling for 
demand at the sector level barely affects our coefficient of interest.  
As we only study clients that interact with multiple dealers, 
we next include client fixed effects to control both for heterogeneity in 
observable and unobservable characteristics at the client level. We find 
that, for the same client, affected dealers reduce repo intermediated 
compared to non-affected dealers. The coefficient now increases 
significantly which suggests that sector fixed effects may not be 
enough to control for demand in this market. 
The economic magnitude of the change we document is 
substantial. The most saturated and therefore preferred model in 
column (4) shows that affected dealers accept almost 66 percentage 
points less repo volumes compared to non-affected dealers from the 
same client in the period after the policy change compared to the 
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period before. As is evident from the results without client fixed 
effects, the magnitude of this effect reflects the combined effect of 
affected dealers reducing repo volumes and non-affecting dealers 
increasing it. In other words, an intensification of the leverage ratio 
reduces dealers’ willingness to engage in repo market activity. This 
average effect might however hide some important heterogeneous 
effects. An issue we turn to next.  
 
5.2  Heterogeneous effects: Small versus large clients  
Motivated by the CGFS (2017) report on repo market functioning, we 
start by differentiating between small and large clients. As interactions 
with large clients are much more frequent, profit margins and franchise 
value tend to be higher. In addition, larger clients are more likely to 
provide ancillary business which justifies use of balance sheet and have 
more negotiating power over the contract terms. Finally, with larger 
clients it is more likely that a dealer can net out a repo with a reverse 
repo transaction which implies that the transaction does not count 
towards the balance sheet. As such, we expect that dealers adjust their 
repo intermediation to small relative to large clients when faced with a 
more binding leverage ratio.  
To examine this conjecture we expand model (1) and allow 
the impact of the regulatory change to differ between small and large 
clients. Our model is as follows: 
 ∆log	('#"()*),- = /0 × 233*45*6	7*8"*9, × H)8""-+ /; × <*"85=#>?ℎ=A,- + B- + I, + C,-  
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where ∆"#$	('#"()*),- , 233*45*6	7*8"*9,  and <*"85=#>?ℎ=A,- are 
defined as before; H)8""-			is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the client 
is small, defined as engaging in below median volume of repo 
transactions in the pre period, and 0 if large; B-	is a vector of client 
fixed effects; I,	is a vector of dealer fixed effects; and C,-  is the error 
term. 233*45*6	7*8"*9, and H)8""-  are only included in the 
specification on their own in versions of Model (2) which exclude B-	and I,, respectively, because otherwise the effect of the former is 
subsumed in the dealer fixed effects, and the effect of the latter is 
subsumed in the client fixed effects. The model is again estimated 
using OLS and standard errors are clustered at the dealer level.   
A negative /0would imply that – all else equal – affected 
dealers reduce the volume of repo they are willing to accept from small 
clients relative to large clients after the policy change, compared to 
dealers not affected by the tightening of the leverage ratio. Besides 
controlling for the pre-shock relationship strength and client fixed 
effects, this specification also allows us to control for dealer fixed 
effects. As such, our model effectively controls for concurrent factors 
that potentially influence affected dealers differently from non-affected 
dealers, such as a regulatory change or (unconventional) monetary 
policy shocks in the home country of the non-affected dealer.  
In terms of raw statistics we see that small and large clients 
differ substantially. In the month prior to the regulatory change large 
clients on average transact 183 times and place on average 14 billion 
pounds cash, while small clients transact 13 times and place on average 
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557 million pounds. In this period, the affected dealers accounted for 
31 and 61 percent of total repo volume accepted from large and small 
clients respectively.  
As in Table 1.1 we first show results without any controls 
(Table 1.2, column 1). We find that dealers subject to the regulatory 
change reduced repo volume to their smaller clients while dealers not 
affected by the change increased it. We do not find a differential effect 
for large clients. On average, affected dealers reduce repo volume 
accepted from their smaller clients by 53 percent, while non-affected 
dealers increase it by 51 percent with the difference being statistically 
significant. For large clients, affected dealers also reduce repo volume 
accepted, but by 12 percent, so the adjustment is much more subdued. 
On the other hand, non-affected dealers slightly increased it by 2 
percent. The difference between the two groups of dealers in this case 
is however not significant.  
Controlling for relationship strength (column 2) and sector 
fixed effects (column 3) barely affects the coefficients. When we next 
control for client fixed effects and thus control for demand and changes 
in quality and credit risk at the client level in column (4) the 
differential effect becomes even more pronounced. In column (5) we 
also include dealer fixed effects. This means that we effectively control 
for concurrent factors that potentially influence the affected dealers 
differently from the non-affected dealers. Using this very restrictive 
specification we confirm the previous results. The estimate of the 
interaction term remains statistically significant at the one percent level 
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and the magnitude remains relatively unchanged compared to the 
specification with only client fixed effects. 
Table 1.2: Heterogeneous Effects: Small versus Large Clients 
 
In terms of economic magnitude, we find (using the most 
saturated specification in column 5) that affected dealers are willing to 
accept 134 percentage points lower volume from their smaller clients 
relative to their larger clients compared to non-affected dealers. Again, 
the magnitude reflects the combined effect of affected dealers reducing 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Affected Dealer  * Small -0.900*** -0.880*** -0.829* -1.415** -1.345***
0.228 0.228 0.397 0.514 0.433
Affected Dealer -0.139 -0.159 -0.196 -0.305
0.207 0.2 0.233 0.278
Small 0.490** 0.446* 0.506**
0.19 0.204 0.195
Relationship -0.487 -0.575 -1.217 -1.101
1.071 1.091 1.328 1.547
Constant 0.017 0.042
0.138 0.133
Client's Sector FE no no yes no no
Client FE no no no yes yes
Dealer FE no no no no yes
N 126 126 126 126 126
R2 0.057 0.058 0.089 0.378 0.463
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Δlog(Volume)
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. Daily transactions are collapsed before and
after the regulatory change using a time window of one month, where Pre={November 21-December
16} and Post={January 05-February 01}. Δlog(Volume) is defined as the pre-post change in the
(log of) the total repo volume accepted by dealer i from client j and is winsorized at 1 and 99
percentiles. Small is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined as client with log volume of repo
transactions below the median client in the market. Relationship is a (demeaned) pre-determined
continuous variable, defined as the ratio of frequency of repo transactions between dealer - client
pair to total number of repo transactions of the dealer. Standard errors allow for correlation at the
dealer level. 
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repo volume they accept from their small relative to their large clients 
and the non-affected dealers increasing it. Because we control for 
client and dealer fixed effects in a first differences model, it is unlikely 
that our results are driven by observable or unobservable time-invariant 
or time-varying dealer heterogeneity or by changes in demand or 
credit-risk at the client level. Summarizing, our results thus indicate 
that affected dealers reduced their repo market intermediation for their 
smaller clients as a result of the change in reporting requirements that 
effectively made the leverage ratio more binding. Larger clients on the 
other hand were not affected.  
 
5.3  Heterogeneous effects: Other client types  
Motivated by the CGFS (2017) report on repo market functioning, we 
first focused our analysis on small vis-à-vis large clients with respect to 
the market as a whole. However, it is possible that affected dealers also 
react differently with respect to other client characteristics. 
Furthermore, one could be worried that Small dummy is a proxy for 
another client characteristic that might be driving our results. Therefore 
in this section we examine a number of other client characteristics. We 
use the same specification as in Table 2, column 5, meaning that in all 
regressions we control for changes in demand and credit risk at the 
client level and concurrent factors at the dealer level.  
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Table 1.3: Heterogeneous Effects: Other Client Types 
 
 First, we focus on the strength of the existing repo 
relationship between dealer and client and examine how this affects the 
adjustment in repo intermediation. We create a dummy variable 
Relationship which is one if the ratio of the frequency of repo 
transactions between dealer i and client j to total number of repo 
transactions of the dealer in the pre-period is above the median, zero 
otherwise. Since repo liquidity conditions are determined by the dealer, 
we want to capture the importance of the client in the dealer’s 
portfolio. For this reason, we define the share within a dealer, rather 
than client.  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Affected Dealer * Relationship 1.259* 0.77                   
0.656 0.795                   
Affected Dealer * Long-Term Repos 0.408 0.419                   
0.487 0.491                   
Affected Dealer * Foreign -0.483 -0.159                   
0.414 0.41                   
Affected Dealer * Reverse Repo -0.093 -0.300
0.637 0.616
Affected Dealer * Small -0.870** -1.350** -1.325** -1.383***
0.386 0.449 0.45 0.433
Client FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dealer FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
R2 0.459 0.469 0.429 0.468 0.427 0.464 0.425 0.465
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. Daily transactions are collapsed before and after the regulatory change using a time window of
one month, where Pre={November 21-December 16} and Post={January 05-February 01}. Δlog(Volume) is defined as the pre-post change in the (log of)
the total repo volume accepted by dealer i from client j and is winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. Relationship is a pre-determined dummy variable,
defined as the above median ratio of the frequency of repo transactions between dealer i and client j to total number of repo transactions of the dealer.
Long-Term Repos is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined as client with average repo maturity above the median client in the market. Foreign is a
dummy variable, defined as client with headquarters outside the UK. Reverse Repo is a dummy variable, defined as client's sector traditionally transacting
more in the reverse repo market and includes pension funds, insurance companies and asset managers. Small  is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined 
as client with log volume of repo transactions below the median client in the market. Models [1]-[2] control for the level effect of Relationship  (omitted). 
Models [5]-[8] control for the strength of the pre-determined relationship of dealer - client pair (omitted). Standard errors allow for correlation at the dealer
level. 
Δlog(Volume)
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The result in Table 1.3, column 1 shows that a stronger 
relationship between dealer and client prior to the policy change lowers 
the effect of the leverage ratio on repo volume and this effect is 
significant at the 10 percent level. In other words, relationships seem to 
matter. However, when we do a horserace between the impact of being 
small and having a strong relationship with the dealer, the impact of 
small is dominant (column 2).27 In other words, while being an 
important client from the point of view of the dealer matters, the 
average size of the client seems to matter more.  
Next, we test whether dealers are more likely to withdraw 
from clients that tend to want to place cash at longer maturities. With 
“daily averaging” a repo transaction with a one week maturity would 
count five days towards the exposure measure, while under “monthly 
averaging” only one day and only if it is on the dealers’ balance sheet 
at months-end. Furthermore, small clients tend on average to have 
somewhat longer maturities. We create a dummy variable Long-Term 
Repos which is one if the average maturity of all repo transactions of 
the client in the pre-period is above the median, zero otherwise. The 
results in columns 3 and 4 show that the length of a normal repo 
transaction does not influence an affected dealer’s decision to 
withdraw from a particular client. The interaction with Small, however, 
remains large and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
Next we examine whether the adjustment is stronger for 
foreign clients as affected (UK) dealers might be more willing to 
                                               
27 The correlation between the relationship and the small dummy is 
below 50 percent.  
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continue lending to domestic clients. While the parameter estimate on 
the interaction with Foreign is negative, it is statistically insignificant 
(columns 5 and 6). Finally, we examine whether affected dealers are 
less likely to adjust to clients that engage more in reverse repo. For 
these clients it might be easier for the dealer to net out a repo with a 
reverse repo transaction and as a result the dealer might be more 
willing to accept repo from them. To examine this we create a dummy 
variable, Reverse Repo, which is one if the client’s sector traditionally 
transacts more in the reverse repo market (pension funds, insurance 
companies and asset managers). The results, columns 7 and 8, show 
that affected dealers do not differentially adjust to these clients. 
Importantly, in both cases, the interaction between affected dealer and 
small remains of the same magnitude and statistically significant.  
Summarizing, the defining client characteristic which 
determines whether a dealer faced with an intensification of the 
leverage ratio adjusts its repo intermediation seems to be the size of the 
client in the market. This finding is consistent with the conjecture of 
CGFS (2017) and market intelligence. In the rest of the paper we 
therefore continue to differentiate between small and large clients.    
 
5.4  Dynamic effects 
Up till now we focused exclusively on the period directly surrounding 
the change in reporting requirements. However, it is insightful to see 
how the parameter on our main interaction effect (Affected Dealer * 
Small) behaves over time. This allows us to examine how persistent the 
change in the market is and to make sure that our results are not driven 
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by any pre-event trends. To this end we re-estimate our model (fully 
saturated with client and dealer fixed effects) but estimate the 
coefficients with rolling symmetric time-windows that end or start in 
our original Pre period {November 21-December 16}. The blue dots in 
Figure 3 indicate the estimate of /0 and the vertical lines indicate the 
90 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are again clustered at 
the dealer level.  
The first point estimate in the graph (labelled as Pre-1 – Pre) 
represents a placebo test and examines whether in the months before 
the change in regulatory requirements affected and non-affected 
dealers behave differently. In this regression the pre-period is moved 
one month back and ranges from October 24 to November 18, 2016. 
The dependent variable ∆"#$	('#"()*),-   is defined as the log change 
in repo volume accepted between this period and the original pre-
period by dealer i from client j. The point estimate shows that in the 
months before the change in regulatory requirements affected and non-
affected dealers do not behave differently, reducing concerns that our 
results are driven by different pre-event trends between the two types 
of dealers.28  
 
 
                                               
28 To further mitigate such concerns, we run a second placebo 
experiment comparing the beginning of our data sample period 
(October 03 to October 21) to our Pre-1 period (October 24 to 
November 18). The results from this exercise again confirm that there 
are no pre-event trends between treatment and control group. Results 
are available upon request.  
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After the change in regulatory reporting requirements, the two 
groups of dealers start diverging with the parameter labelled as Pre-
Post representing the point estimate of Table 1.2, column 5. 
Importantly, the results show that this differential effect persists into 
February (labelled Pre-Post+1). This finding is consistent with the 
manifestation of a persistent change in repo market intermediation 
because of the intensification of the leverage ratio, with affected 
dealers moving away from smaller clients.  
 
5.5  Other margins of adjustment 
Up till now we focused our attention on how dealers adjusted repo 
volumes they accepted from their (smaller) clients. However, our 
database is rich and allows us to study other margins of adjustment as 
well. This helps us to put rigor to the causal interpretation of our 
findings as one would expect dealers to react to an intensification of 
the leverage ratio by adjusting volume and prices, however it should 
Figure 1.3: Repo Volume Time-Varying DiD Estimates: Small-Large 
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not affect the margins that capture credit risk or business models as 
those are not affected by the change in the reporting requirements.  
We construct four new dependent variables. First, we look at 
the extensive margin and create the dependent variable 
Δlog(#Transactions) which is the pre-post change in the (log of) the 
total number of repo transactions accepted by dealer i from client j. 
While our previous dependent variable captures the outcome of the 
negotiation between dealer and client in terms of repo size, this 
variable captures whether the dealer and client match (i.e. the extensive 
margin of trading activity). We would expect that affected dealers 
adjust on this margin.  
 
Table 1.4: Other Margins of Adjustment 
 
Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Affected Dealer -0.388** -0.006 0.503 0.343
0.175 0.026 0.407 0.219
Affected Dealer * Small -0.829*** -0.088*** 1.168 -0.155
0.204 0.022 0.86 0.238
Client FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dealer FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
R2 0.32 0.475 0.405 0.53 0.409 0.563 0.309 0.452
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. Daily transactions are collapsed before and after the regulatory change using a time window of
one month, where Pre={November 21-December 16} and Post={January 05-February 01}. In columns [1]-[2], Δlog(# Transactions) is defined as the pre-
post change in the (log of) the total number of repo transactions accepted by dealer i from client j and is winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. In columns
[3]-[8], ΔRate, ΔHaircut and Δlog(Maturity) denote the pre-post change in the average repo rate, average collateral haircut and the pre-post growth of
average maturity (in days) and are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. Small is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined as client with log volume of repo
transactions below the median client in the market. All models control for the strength of the pre-determined relationship of dealer- client pair (omitted).
Standard errors allow for correlation at the dealer level. 
ΔHaircutΔlog(# Transactions) ΔRate Δlog(Maturity)
Extensive Margin Repo Loan Terms
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In line with our expectation, we find that affected dealers after 
the policy change reduced the number of transactions they engaged in 
with 39 percentage points compared to non-affected dealers (Table 1.4, 
column 1). When we again allow the impact to differ across small and 
large clients (column 2), we find that dealers subject to the regulatory 
change significantly reduced the number of transactions they engaged 
in with smaller clients relative to the number of transactions with large 
clients compared to dealers not affected by the change. Again, as we 
saturate the model with client and dealer fixed effects this result is not 
driven by changes in demand or riskiness as the client level or 
concurrent factors affecting dealers. In terms of economic magnitude, 
we find that affected dealers reduce with 83 percentage points the 
number of transactions with their smaller clients relative to larger 
clients compared to non-affected dealers.  
 Second, we study the adjustment in repo rates that affected 
dealers are willing to offer. If the cost of repo increases because of the 
intensification of the leverage ratio, dealers can, besides lowering the 
volume or the number of transactions, also lower the repo rates they 
are willing to offer to clients that want to place cash. To examine 
whether dealers also adjust on the price dimension we construct the 
dependent variable ΔRate which equals the pre-post change in the 
average repo rate offered by dealer i to client j. The result in column 
(3) shows that following the change in reporting requirements affected 
dealers were on average not adjusting repo rates to their clients relative 
to non-affected dealers. However, when we allow for heterogeneous 
effects (column 4) we find that affected dealers indeed adjusted repo 
50 
 
rates offered to their small clients. In terms of economic magnitude, we 
find that affected dealers are willing to pay a 9 basis points lower repo 
rate to their smaller clients relative to their larger clients compared to 
non-affected dealers.  
Third, we examine whether dealers adjust haircuts after the 
change in reporting requirements. In repo transactions haircuts are used 
to protect the cash lender from credit and liquidity risk associated with 
the asset used as collateral. A haircut represents the difference between 
the market value of the asset used as collateral in the transaction and 
the purchase price paid at the start of a repo. The haircut is expressed 
as the percentage deduction from the market value of collateral. As the 
haircut protects the cash lender against credit and liquidity risk, we 
should not expect an adjustment in the wake of the intensification of 
the leverage ratio. Hence, examining the change in haircut at the 
dealer-client pair level can function as a falsification test. We construct 
a new dependent variable, ΔHaircut, which measures the change in the 
average haircut before and after the change in reporting requirements. 
As expected, and in line with our interpretation of a causal impact of 
the leverage ratio on repo intermediation, we do not find an adjustment 
on haircuts (columns 5 and 6).  
A final margin we look at is the maturity of repo. The 
majority of repo transactions tend to be overnight (70 percent in our 
sample), however they can also have longer maturities. The maturity 
requested by the end-user is often a function of their business model. 
For example, insurance companies tend to opt for longer maturities 
compared to banks. Furthermore, the willingness to extend longer 
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maturity repos is also related to the riskiness of the client. For both 
these reasons one would not necessarily expect a change in maturity 
due to the intensification of the leverage ratio. However, on the other 
hand, dealers might be less willing to engage in longer term repo after 
the change in regulatory reporting as now the dealer has to include the 
repo in its exposure measure on each day until maturity, while before it 
only had to include it if it had not matured at month-end. Our fourth 
dependent variable Δlog(Maturity) is defined as the pre-post change in 
the (log of) the average maturity (in number of days) of the 
transactions between dealer i from client j. In line with the 
interpretation that repo maturities reflect the business model of the 
client, we do not find a change in maturities after the change in 
regulatory reporting. Not in general and not for smaller clients in 
particular (columns 7 and 8).  
Finally, we examine the dynamic adjustment for the two 
margins (number of transactions and repo rates) that are adjusted by 
the affected dealers differentiating between small and large clients. As 
with the adjustment in the repo volume, we find that in the months 
before the change in regulatory requirements affected and non-affected 
dealers do not behave differently (Figure 4). The two groups of dealers 
only start diverging after the shock and this differential effect persists.     
 
5.6  Further robustness 
In this section we set out to put further robustness to our results. We 
first perform an additional falsification test by examining whether 
affected dealers were also reducing the volume of cash they were 
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willing to lend (reverse repo) after the change in regulatory 
requirements. Reverse repo does not affect the balance sheet so we do 
not expect an impact of the intensification of the leverage ratio. Indeed, 
the results in Table 1.5 show that affected dealers were not reducing 
the amount of cash they were lending to their clients relative to non-
affected dealers (column 1). We also do not detect any differential 
effect with respect to their small clients (column 2). These results again 
indicate that a reduction in repo intermediation by affected dealers can 
be attributed to the intensification of the leverage ratio. 29 
 
 
 
                                               
29 It would also be insightful to examine whether the reduction in 
volume is stronger for repos conducted against general compared to 
repos conducted against special collateral. Special collateral is a repo 
in which the cash provider requests a specific security (individual 
ISIN) to be provided by the cash borrower (security-driven repos). 
General collateral is a repo in which the security lender may choose the 
security to pledge as collateral with the cash provider (cash-driven 
repos). When negotiating special repos, a dealer agrees on the 
collateral first and then the size, price and term of such transactions. As 
such, the rate of special repos is usually below the rate of general 
repos, in other words, the margin on these repos is higher. As such one 
would expect affected dealers to especially reduce general collateral 
repo. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to identify with certainty 
whether repos are conducted against general or special collateral, 
because this field is optional to report. In our sample period, 
approximately 43 percent of transactions provide no such information, 
24 percent are special and 33 percent are general repos.      
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Table 1.5: Leverage Ratio and Reverse Repos 
 
Next we examine the sensitivity of our results to our 
definition of small clients. Up till now we identified a client as small if 
it engaged in below median volume of repo transactions in the pre 
period. In Table 1.6 we first define small as a client with the number of 
Baseline Heterogeneous
[1] [2]
Affected Dealer -0.283
0.197
Affected Dealer * Small 0.703
0.682
Client FE yes yes
Dealer FE no yes
N 133 133
R2 0.372 0.494
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. Daily
transactions are collapsed before and after the regulatory change
using a time window of one month, where Pre={November 21-
December 16} and Post={January 05-February 01}. Δlog(Volume)  is 
defined as the pre-post change in the (log of) the total repo volume
accepted by dealer i from client j and is winsorized at 1 and 99
percentiles. Small is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined as
client with log volume of reverse repo transactions below the median
client in the market. All models control for the strength of the pre-
determined relationship of dealer - client pair in the reverse repo
market (omitted). Standard errors allow for correlation at the dealer
level. 
Δlog(Volume)
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transactions below the median (column 1). In addition, we use three 
continuous variables: the log volume of the client in the repo market 
(column 2), the log number of transactions of the client in the repo 
market (column 3) and the log volume divided by the number of 
transactions of the client in the repo market (column 4), all three 
measured before the regulatory change. In all cases the interaction of 
affected with small is of the right sign and significantly different from 
zero, indicating that our results are not sensitive to our definition of 
small clients.    
Table 1.6: Alternative Definitions for Small Client 
  
Frequency 
(dummy)
Volume 
(continuous)
Frequency 
(continuous)
Volume/Trans.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Affected Dealer * Small -1.345*** 0.367** 0.427* 0.516** 
0.433 0.143 0.194 0.212
Client FE yes yes yes yes
Dealer FE yes yes yes yes
N 126 126 126 126
R2 0.463 0.468 0.459 0.442
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Δlog(Volume)
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. Daily transactions are collapsed before
and after the regulatory change using a time window of one month, where Pre={November 21-
December 16} and Post={January 05-February 01}. Δlog(Volume) is defined as the pre-post
change in the (log of) the total repo volume accepted by dealer i from client j and is winsorized
at 1 and 99 percentiles. Frequency (dummy) is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined as
client with log frequency of repo transactions below the median client in the market. Volume 
(continuous) is a pre-determined continuous variable, defined as the log volume of repo
transactions of client in the market. Frequency (continuous) is a pre-determined continuous
variable, defined as the log frequency of repo transactions of client in the market.
Volume/Trans. is a pre-determined continuous variable, defined as the log volume to frequency
of repo transactions of client in the market. All models control for the strength of the pre-
determined relationship of dealer- client pair (omitted). Standard errors allow for correlation at
the dealer level. 
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Any choice of sample period is arbitrary as it is not obvious 
how much time it would take for the adjustment in the market to take 
place. Focusing on a short time horizon could bias the results against 
finding anything because especially smaller clients might not be active 
in both periods. Taking a longer time horizon increases the risk of 
other factors (both in the UK and abroad) affecting the market 
convoluting our identification strategy. Furthermore, it is not entirely 
clear how much time one should account to nullify the impact of the 
end-of-year volatility. To this end we adjust in Table 1.7 the time 
period along several dimensions. In columns 1 and 2 we only exclude 
the last day of the year. In columns 3 and 4 we drop the days in 
November as at two points during this month there is a drop in repo 
volume accepted by the affected dealers. In columns 5 and 6 we 
expand the pre-period and have it start on October 31, 2016 and in 
columns 7 and 8 we extend the post-period and have it end on February 
22. Regardless of the time period we exploit, our results indicate that 
dealer banks subject to the regulatory change reduced repo volume to 
their smaller clients compared to dealer banks not affected by the 
change.  
56 
 
Table 1.7: Alternative Time-Windows 
 
 
 Finally we test whether our results are robust to different 
specifications and assumptions regarding the clustering of the error 
terms and how we deal with outliers. In Table 1.8, in order to mitigate 
concerns that differences in maturity drives the impact of repo volumes 
on dealer balance sheets, we first re-estimate our baseline and 
heterogeneous models employing Weighted Least Squares (WLS) 
using as weights the average maturity of transactions of dealer-client 
pairs before the policy change.30 Columns 1 and 2 confirm our 
conclusions, although the estimate of the interaction effect is somewhat 
smaller. Next, although Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) show 
that cluster-robust standard errors still perform reasonably well with 15 
clusters, we eliminate remaining concerns by employing a wild cluster 
                                               
30 We also test whether our results are driven by clients trading in very 
long maturities. We confirm that our conclusions remain unchanged 
when we restrict our sample to dealer-client pairs that only engage in 
repo with a maturity of up to 4 weeks.    
Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Affected Dealer -0.598* -0.916** -0.594* -0.354                   
0.303 0.331 0.277 0.271                   
Affected Dealer * Small -0.868* -1.087* -0.812* -0.824** 
0.49 0.506 0.422 0.368
Client FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dealer FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
N 134 134 109 109 139 139 142 142
R2 0.265 0.397 0.352 0.48 0.466 0.555 0.394 0.455
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Expand Post-Period
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. In columns [1]-[2] daily transactions are collapsed before and after the regulatory change dropping the
year-end business day only, where Pre={November 21-December 29} and Post={January 02-February 01}. In columns [3]-[4] daily transactions are collapsed
before and after the regulatory change dropping November adjustment, where Pre={December 05-December 16} and Post={January 05-February 01}. In columns
[5]-[6] daily transactions are collapsed before and after the regulatory change expanding the pre-period, where Pre={October 31-December 16} and Post={January
05-February 01}. In columns [7]-[8] daily transactions are collapsed before and after the regulatory change expanding the post-period, where Pre={November 21-
December 16} and Post={January 05-February 22}. Δlog(Volume) is defined as the pre-post change in the (log of) the total repo volume accepted by dealer i  from 
client j and is winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. All models control for the strength of the pre-determined relationship of dealer- client pair (omitted). Standard
errors allow for correlation at the dealer level. 
Δlog(Volume)
Drop November Adjustment Expand Pre-PeriodDrop Year-End Day Only
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bootstrap method as recommended by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 
(2008) and Cameron and Miller (2015). This procedure allows us to 
account for the correlation in the error terms of clients placing cash 
with the same dealer bank with relatively few clusters. In columns 3 
and 4, we report wild cluster bootstrap p-values, which confirm our 
conclusions suggesting that the clustering strategy has little effect on 
our results.31 Finally, we employ an alternative winsorising technique 
at the 5th and 95th level instead of the 1st  
and 99th and we find again very similar results as in our baseline 
models.  
Table 1.8: Further Robustness Checks 
 
 
 
                                               
31 We generate these p-values by employing the post-estimation 
command boottest (Roodman, 2015), assuming the null hypothesis and 
setting replications to 1000.  
Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Affected -0.653** -0.664* -0.436*
0.275 [0.056] 0.227
Affected Dealer  * Small -1.096* -1.345* -0.953***
0.655 [0.054] 0.284
Client FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dealer FE no yes no yes no yes
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
R2 0.342 0.586 - - 0.362 0.492
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Wild Cluster Bootstrap Winsorize 5/95
Note: The table presents results from baseline regressions. Daily transactions are collapsed before and after the regulatory change using a time window
of one month, where Pre={November 21-December 16} and Post={January 05-February 01}. Δlog(Volume) is defined as the pre-post change in the (log
of) the total repo volume accepted by dealer i from client j and is winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. In columns [1]-[2] we employ a weighted least
squares estimation technique using as weights the average maturity before the policy change. In columns [3]-[4] we correct the inference with the wild
cluster bootstrap method. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values are reported in brackets employing the post-estimation command boottest, assuming the null
hypothesis and setting replications to 1000. In columns [5]-[6] we employ an alternative winsorizing technique at the 5 and 95 percentiles. Small is a pre-
determined dummy variable, defined as client with log volume of repo transactions below the median client in the market. All models control for the
strength of the pre-determined relationship of dealer- client pair (omitted). Standard errors allow for correlation at the dealer level. 
Δlog(Volume)
WLS
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6. Aggregate effect and market adjustment 
Finally, we investigate the aggregate effect of the intensification of the 
leverage ratio which incentivised affected dealers to move away from 
small end-users. We can do a conservative back of the envelope 
calculation and assess to what extent small end-users were affected in 
aggregate. Using the OLS estimates of Table 2, column 1 we estimate 
that affected banks on average reduced repo volume to their small 
clients with 53 percent.32 As affected dealers were prior to the 
regulatory change intermediating 61 percent of total repo volume from 
small end-users, this implies that, keeping all else equal and not 
allowing for the possibility of substitution, the withdrawal of affected 
dealers resulted in small end-users being able to place 32 percent, 
equaling 2.9 billion pounds,  less cash in the gilt repo market.   
 The next question is whether these small end-users were able 
to switch to other, non-affected dealers and place their cash with them 
instead. To check whether indeed this was the case, we run a set of 
client-level regressions with the growth rate of the client’s total repo 
volume as the dependent variable. We are interested to see if small 
clients that were more exposed to the affected dealers were 
experiencing lower growth rates compared to small clients less 
exposed. To this end we construct a measure of the average exposure 
to affected dealers for each client before the policy shock. That is, for 
each client we measure the ratio of each client's repo volumes with 
affected dealers to the client's total repo volumes before the regulatory 
                                               
32 This is the combined effect of the constant, the affected dummy, the 
small dummy and the affected*small interaction effect.  
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change. As we are interested in the growth rate at the client level, we 
cannot absorb client demand directly with client fixed effects. If the 
exposure measure is correlated with demand, something we cannot rule 
out, our OLS estimates would be biased. In order to control for clients’ 
repo demand we follow Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), 
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2016) and Cingano, Manaresi and Sette 
(2016) and include in our model a vector of client-level estimated 
dummies B-  that we extract from model (2) in Section 5.2.33 The 
model we estimate is as follows: 
 ∆ "#$(2$$9'#"()*)-= /0 × J=$ℎ"K	LMA#?*6-+ /; × J=$ℎ"K	LMA#?*6- × H)8""- + /N × H)8""-+ B- + C-  
 
where ∆"#$	(2$$9'#"()*),-  is the pre-post change in the (log of) the 
total repo volume accepted by all (new and existing) dealers from 
client j, winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  J=$ℎ"KLMA#?*6- is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the client has above median share of its 
repos intermediated by affected dealers, zero otherwise; 	H)8""-			is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the client is small, defined as engaging in 
                                               
33 Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2016) and Cingano, Manaresi and 
Sette (2016) show that this methodology is equivalent to an alternative 
methodology to control for demand developed by Jimenez, Mian, 
Peydro and Saurina (2014), where a numerical correction of the 
difference of the OLS and FE estimate is applied.  
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below median volume of repo transactions in the pre period, and 0 if 
large; B- 	is a vector of client-level estimated dummies capturing 
demand; and C,-  is the error term. To account for correlation in the 
error terms of clients within the same sector, and given that the number 
of sectors is 7, we employ the wild cluster bootstrap method of 
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) and report the respective p-
values.34  
 The result in Table 1.9, column 1 shows that highly exposed 
clients experience a lower growth in total repo volume (i.e. the amount 
of cash they are placing with all dealers), but this effect is not 
significant. When we allow this effect to differ between large and small 
clients (column 2) we find that it is driven by the small clients, in line 
with our previous results. The parameters are smaller (less negative) 
compared to the estimates at the dealer-client level. This suggests that 
partial substitution was possible, in line with our previous finding that 
non-affected dealers were on average accepting more repo from their 
small clients after the policy change.  
                                               
34 Clustering at the sector level would not perform well and would lead 
to high rejection rates when the number of clusters is approximately 6, 
as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). 
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Table 1.9: Market Adjustment: Substitution and New Repo 
Relationships 
  
     
In the last two columns of Table 1.9 we examine whether this 
substitution was primarily done through an intensification of pre-
existing relationships or through the establishment of new ones. We 
construct a new dependent variable, New Repo Relationship, which is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the client started in the month after the 
regulatory change a relationship with a dealer with whom it had no 
relationship in the pre-period, zero otherwise. We do not find any 
indication that more exposed clients are more likely to start a new 
relationship, which suggests that exposed clients substitute with non-
affected dealers with whom they already had a relationship and did not 
switch to new dealers.  
Baseline Heterogeneous Baseline Heterogeneous
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Highly Exposed -0.390 -0.136 -0.007 -0.093
[0.273] [0.889] [0.971] [0.452]
Highly Exposed * Small -0.584* 0.165
[0.088] [0.3]
Small -0.084 0.186
[0.714] [0.354]
Constant 0.285 0.371** 0.419 0.326
[0.388] [0.047] [0.159] [0.471]
Client Demand yes yes yes yes
N 38 38 38 38
Significance Levels:  .01***; .05**; .1*
Note: The table presents results from OLS regressions. Daily transactions are collapsed before and after
the regulatory change using a time window of one month, where Pre={November 21-December 16} and
Post={January 05-February 01}. Δlog(AggrVolume) is defined as the pre-post change in the (log of) the
total repo volume accepted by all dealers from client j and is winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. New 
Repo Relationship is a dummy that is one if the client established a new relationship with a dealer after
the regulatory change. Highly Exposed is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined as client with above
median share of repos intermediated by affected dealers to total repos intermediated by all dealers in the
market. Small is a pre-determined dummy variable, defined as client with log volume of repo transactions
below the median client in the market. Client demand is a vector of client-level dummies estimated in the
within-client regression. We employ the wild cluster bootstrap method. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values
are reported in brackets, assuming the null hypothesis and setting replications to 1000. Standard errors
allow for correlation at the client's sector level. 
Δlog(AggrVolume) New Repo Relationship
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Our finding that the small end-users, particularly the ones less 
exposed to affected dealers, were able to substitute with non-affected, 
foreign dealers is confirmed when we look at the change in market 
share of affected and non-affected dealers after the intensification of 
the leverage ratio. While the group of affected dealers increased their 
market share of the large clients from 31 to 34 percent, they reduced it 
from 61 to 51 percent for the smaller clients.   
 
7. Conclusion and policy implications  
This paper investigates the impact of the leverage ratio on dealer-client 
repo intermediation, focusing on both bank and non-bank end-users. 
We exploit a new, unique, supervisory transaction-level dataset 
capturing the near-universe of bilateral gilt repo market trading in 
combination with a regulatory change in the UK. Studying adjustments 
within dealer-client pairs, we find that dealers subject to a tightening of 
the leverage ratio due to a change in its reporting requirements 
persistently reduced repo volume they accepted from their small clients 
compared to dealers not affected by the change. Large clients were not 
affected. We also find that dealers tend to move away from clients with 
whom they have a weaker relationship; however the impact of size 
dominates. In addition, we document a (persistent) reduction in the 
frequency of transactions and in repo rates offered, but no adjustment 
in haircuts or maturities. Studying the aggregate effect, we find 
evidence that suggests that competing, non-constrained, foreign dealers 
took the opportunity to capture market share when affected, UK 
dealers withdrew from the small end-user segment of the dealer-client 
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market. The market therefore seems to have been resilient and adjusted 
quickly.  
All in all, our results show that dealers react to an 
intensification of the leverage ratio by stepping away from smaller end-
users. This finding has important policy implications as it shows that 
capital regulation has the potential to undermine the level playing field 
of small banks and non-bank financial institutions relative to their 
larger competitors as the increased cost of engaging in repo activity is 
disproportionately levied onto them. Without other dealers stepping in, 
this implies that these smaller end-users ultimately have to pass on 
these costs to their clients. Furthermore, it can incentivize them to 
invest their cash in more risky ways (e.g. longer maturities or against 
lower quality or no collateral), it can impair their access to derivatives 
markets and it can increase the cost they face when hedging interest 
rate risk. These effects can be mitigated if other dealers step into the 
void as seems to have happened in the UK. While this can alleviate the 
short-run impact of a more binding leverage ratio it has the potential to 
make the market more unstable. A stronger reliance on foreign dealers 
can potentially imply more instability as during times of stress foreign 
lenders tend to flight home (Gianetti and Laeven, 2012) and reduce 
lending especially to marginal borrowers (De Haas and Van Horen, 
2013).  
A possible way to reduce the impact of the leverage ratio on 
repo market liquidity for small end-users would be to widen 
participation in CCPs to end-users of repos. If end-users are members 
of the same CCP as their intermediating dealer, then the dealer will be 
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able to net the transaction for the purpose of the regulation. In recent 
years there have been several initiatives, including by the Bank of 
England, to reduce barriers for smaller firms to joining the CCP. 
Furthermore, intermediation might be improved through competition 
effects by disintermediation of banks in return for a larger role for non-
bank intermediaries not subject to the leverage ratio. However, a 
growing role of non-bank dealers in the repo market can also make the 
market more susceptible to financial instability risks as these dealers 
are not regulated.      
Importantly, our paper does not attempt to quantify the net 
benefits of the regulatory leverage ratio. The leverage ratio has 
important benefits for the financial system as a whole. By increasing 
the capitalization of banks, the leverage ratio mitigates the risk of 
destabilizing deleveraging processes. Furthermore, as it is independent 
of risk, it provides a safeguard against model risk and measurement 
error which affects the capital ratio. In addition, as there are risks 
associated with excessive liquidity a lower level of liquidity in the repo 
market might not be sub-optimal. While quantifying the net 
costs/benefits of the leverage ratio is beyond the scope of this paper, 
our results indicate that the leverage ratio affects some end-users in the 
repo market more than others. As such, policy measures that improve 
repo market liquidity for these end-users might be useful.    
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A Appendix 
 
A.1 UK Leverage Ratio Timeline 
Table A.1: UK Leverage Ratio Timeline 
 
 
 
 
Dates Policy Measure
December 2010 Basel announces 3% leverage ratio for disclosure purposes as of 01/01/2015 and with a view to moving to a minimum requirement in 2018
January 2011 Basel deadline for supervisory monitoring period for LR
January 2013 Basel deadline for LR reporting
January 2013 PRA contacts the 7 major UK banks asking them to start disclosing year-end and mid-year leverage ratios based on the Basel definition
June 2013 Publication of EU CRR, announcing a mandatory LR disclosure requirement as of 01/01/2015
December 2013 Major EU banks start voluntarily disclosing LRs 
July 2014 FPC consults on a review considering the need for a LR requirement
October 2014 FPC finalises its LR review and recommends HMT give them powers of Direction for a LR
January 2015 Introduction of LR disclosure requirements as per EU law
April 2015 HMT gives FPC powers of Direction over a LR
July 2015 FPC publishes policy statement on the LR and directs PRA to implement a LR
December 2015 PRA finalises LR policy  
January 2016 LR requirement comes into force for the 7 major UK banks, which also start reporting exposures based on the average of the last day of every month (“monthly average”)
August 2016 FPC and PRA announce the exclusion of central bank reserves from the exposure measure of the UK requirement that applies to the 7 banks
January 2017 7 UK banks start reporting leverage exposures based on average of every day in quarter (“daily average”) 
June 2017 FPC and PRA consult on a recalibration of the minimum LR requirement that applies to the 7 major UK banks 
October 2017 FPC and PRA recalibrate the minimum LR requirement that applies to major UK banks to 3.25%
January 2018 The 7 major UK banks start disclosing daily average exposure measures
Note:  The table presents the timeline of the UK leverage ratio requirement.
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A.2 Summary Statistics 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Units Definition N mean sd p(10) p(25) p(50) p(75) p(90)
Δlog(Volume) % The log change in repo volume accepted by dealer i from client j in the month
after the regulatory change compared to the month before, winsorized at 1 and
99th percentile
126 -0.02 1.19 -1.26 -0.48 0.05 0.54 1.18
Δlog(# 
Transactions)
% The log change in frequency of repo transactions between dealer i and client j  in 
the month after the regulatory change compared to the month before, winsorized
at 1 and 99th percentile
126 -0.04 0.70 -0.92 -0.41 0 0.34 0.69
ΔRate Δ The first-difference change in the average repo rate offerred by dealer i to client j 
in the month after the regulatory change compared to the month before,
winsorized at 1 and 99th percentile
126 0.04 0.1 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.11
ΔHaircut Δ The first-difference change in the average collateral haircut required by dealer i
from client j in the month after the regulatory change compared to the month
before, winsorized at 1 and 99th percentile
126 0.19 1.47 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26
Δlog(Maturity) % Log change of average maturity (in days) offerred by dealer i to client j in the
month after the regulatory change compared to the month before, winsorized at 1
and 99th percentile
126 0.01 0.91 -0.92 -0.39 0.00 0.37 1.18
Affected dealer 0/1 Dealer in gilt repo market subject to the regulatory change 126 0.38 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
Small 0/1 Client with repo volume below the median client in month before the regulatory
change
126 0.29 0.45 0 0 0 1 1
Small (frequency 
dummy)
0/1 Client with number of transactions below the median client in month before the
regulatory change 
126 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1
Small (volume) continuous Log repo volume of client in month before the regulatory change 126 22.13 1.79 19.48 21.12 22.24 23.34 24.44
Small (frequency) continuous Log number of transactions of client in month before the regulatory change 126 4.43 1.37 2.30 3.14 4.88 5.20 6.15
Small (volume per 
transaction)
continuous Log volume per transaction of client in month before the regulatory change 126 17.74 0.76 16.9 17.34 17.79 18.24 18.65
Relationship continuous Ratio of number of repo transactions between dealer - client to total number of
repo transactions of the dealer in month before the regulatory change 
126 0.02 0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.13
Δlog(AggrVolume) % Log change in repo volume accepted by all dealers from client j in the month after
the regulatory change compared to the month before, winsorized at 1 and 99th
percentile
38 -0.06 0.73 -1.04 -0.26 0.08 0.41 0.57
New Repo 
Relationship
0/1 Dummy that is one if the client established a new relationship with a dealer after
the regulatory change, zero otherwise
38 0.39 0.5 0 0 0 1 1
Highly Exposed 0/1 Client with above median share of repos intermediated by affected dealers to total
repos intermediated by all dealers in the market 
38 0.50 0.51 0 0 0.50 1 1
Note:  The table presents the definitions and summary statistics of all variables used in our regressions. 
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Chapter 2 
 
THE REAL EFFECTS OF CAPITAL OUTFLOW CONTROLS: 
THE TRADE AND FINANCIAL CHANNELS 
 
Joint with Dimitris Malliaropulos 
 
“Permanent capital controls can be applied on a subset of 
assets either on the inflow side or the outflow side. It is, at 
this stage, hard to assess rigorously the effect of such 
policy on financial stability and its side effects (…)” 
Helene Rey35 
 
1. Introduction   
Helene Rey in her Jackson Hole speech (Rey, 
2013) argued that a global financial cycle is affecting local 
credit conditions in emerging markets. A large literature 
supports this view (Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), 
Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl and Wolfenzon (2015), 
Baskaya, di Giovanni, Kalemli-Ozcan, Peydro and Ulu 
(2017), Morais, Peydro, Roldan and Ruiz (2019)). After 
                                               
35 The quote is from the paper of Helene Rey “Dilemma not 
Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary 
Policy Independence” in 2013. 
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nearly a decade, as monetary policy in advanced economies 
begins to normalize and global financial conditions tighten, 
many emerging market economies either adjust their FX 
market operations or explicitly manage capital outflows. 
While recent evidence suggests that FX market operations 
mitigate the vulnerability of local banks to the global 
financial cycle (Ahnert, Forbes, Friedrich and Reinhardt 
(2018)), much less is known on capital outflow controls. 
How effective are controls in preventing capital outflows? 
What is the effect on financial stability? Are there any real 
(side) effects? And, if so, what are the channels of 
transmission? As the quote of Helene Rey above implies, 
the evaluation of capital outflow controls remains an open 
question36.       
We address these questions analyzing microdata 
from Greece. In June 2015, Greece introduced a series of 
administrative restrictions on capital outflows to stabilize 
the banking system following a period of increased 
uncertainty and an extensive bank run. Restrictions on 
capital outflows contained the bank run and helped to 
restore financial stability (Figure 2.1). However, they 
restricted the ability of firms to pay for imported inputs and 
                                               
36 Korinek (2011) provides an overview of the new 
economics of prudential capital controls that focus 
exclusively on capital inflows. Demirguc-Kunt and Serven 
(2010) discuss that capital outflow controls are of equal 
importance.  
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affected the availability of bank credit in subsequent 
months. 
 
Figure 2.1: Level of Deposits in the Greek Banking 
System 
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additional costs to the importing process37. As such, 
importers were facing difficulties to meet their obligations 
with international suppliers of raw materials38. During this 
period, imports decreased by 13% on average on a yearly 
basis (Figure 2.2, top panel). As the literature has 
documented (Amiti and Konings (2007), Feng, Li and 
Swenson (2016)), exports adjust to the extent that imported 
inputs are embodied in the exported products and this gives 
rise to the trade channel of capital outflow controls.   
At the same time, banks were facing severe 
liquidity and solvency issues. In the wake of outflow 
controls, the investment possibilities of domestic firms 
were restricted as they were cut off from the global 
financial markets. Their ability to diversify risks was 
restricted, increasing the volatility of their value (Merton 
(1974), Forbes (2007b)). Banks responded by curtailing the 
provision of credit and tightening financial constraints39. 
During this period, total credit contracted by 2% (Figure 
2.2, bottom panel). As the literature has documented (Foley 
                                               
37 The primary reason of rejection of an application was the 
lack of proper documentation, which accounted for 31% of 
all submitted applications to the committee. 
38 Contractual obligations with domestic suppliers could 
still be met since payments were taking place within the 
Greek banking system. 
39 Controls on capital outflows lower the cost of borrowing 
for firms because national savings remain captive in the 
local market (Gallego and Hernandez (2003)). As a result, 
the effect on credit supply might be the opposite. 
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and Manova (2015)), exports adjust to the extent that bank 
credit is used to cover exports-related costs such as product 
customization, insurance and transportation and this gives 
rise to the financial channel of outflow controls. 
In this period, exports decreased by 10% on 
average on a yearly basis (Figure 2.3).  This suggests that 
capital outflows regulation implies a significant cost to the 
real economy. How much of this decrease is because of 
changes in imported inputs and how much of this decrease 
is because of changes in external financing conditions is an 
important question to design policy responses. If the 
decrease in imported inputs is the main driver behind the 
decrease in exports, the focus should be on loosening 
capital outflow controls. Instead, if credit factors are the 
main drivers behind the decrease in exports, the policy 
response should involve the recapitalization of the banking 
sector. This paper is the first to analyze the transmission 
channels and side effects on the real economy of capital 
outflow controls as a financial stability tool. 
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Figure 2.2: Imports and Credit Supply before and after 
Capital Controls 
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intensities. Pre-determined benchmark industry 
characteristics are by construction exogenous to individual 
firms, allowing us to circumvent endogeneity concerns due 
to omitted variables and reverse causality. The advantage 
of our approach (i.e. exploiting within-firm variation) is to 
more convincingly establish the causal effect of outflow 
controls on firm exports. We proxy for the trade channel 
with an industry’s Import Content of Exports, which builds 
directly on the work of Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001). This 
measure calculates the direct and indirect participation of 
imported intermediate inputs in an industry’s gross exports. 
In other words, it gives a sense of an industry’s 
international backward linkages in global value chains. The 
larger this measure is, the greater the imported input 
content of an industry’s gross exports. We proxy for the 
financial channel with an industry’s External Finance 
Dependence, which builds directly on the work of Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). This measure calculates the share of 
capital expenditures not financed with internally generated 
cash flows and identifies the outside funding that firms 
require for operational purposes. The larger this measure is, 
the greater the dependence of an industry on bank credit. 
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Figure 2.3: Exports before and after Capital Controls 
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the Greek crisis and in the run-up to outflow controls, firms 
changed their cash reserves strategy by stockpiling cash out 
of the Greek banking system and in foreign banks 
insulating them from the weak local banks. We show that 
firms with higher dependence on banking services (e.g. 
bank guarantees, loans etc.) did not perform worse 
compared to firms with lower dependence on banking 
services in terms of exports of the same import-intensive 
product. To put it differently, there is no financial channel 
that drives the adjustment of exports at the intensive 
margin. This is in line with firms having increased their 
demand for cash before outflow controls insulating them 
from the weak local banks during outflow controls. Indeed, 
circumventing endogeneity concerns, we show that firms 
with active foreign bank accounts did better in terms of 
exports of the same import-intensive product as compared 
to firms with no foreign bank accounts. In other words, in 
the run-up to outflow controls, firms became more cash- 
and less credit-dependent and this cash buffer abroad was 
sufficient to cover the variable short-run costs of exports, 
which are associated with the intensive margin. Conditional 
on a foreign bank account, large firms, multinationals and 
net exporters were even less negatively affected by outflow 
controls as they were likely to retain relatively more cash in 
foreign banks in the run-up to the policy shock.        
76 
 
However, the cash buffer abroad was only limited 
to cover the large, sunk costs of exports that are associated 
with the extensive margin. It is well documented in the 
literature (e.g. Foley and Manova (2015)) that banks play a 
critical role in the financing of the large upfront costs of 
exports (e.g. product customization, maintenance of an 
international distribution network). We show that, 
regardless of their cash reserves strategy prior to the policy 
shock, firms with greater dependence on external financing 
reduced the range of products they exported and the range 
of destinations (export markets) they served; in particular, a 
one standard deviation in an industry’s dependence on 
external financing is related to a 3pp lower growth of 
products exported, 4pp lower growth of destinations served 
and 5.3pp lower growth of export trading relationships (i.e. 
product–destination pairs) of a firm. 
Taken together, these results suggest that capital 
outflow controls help to restore financial stability, but has 
unintended real consequences that manifest themselves 
through multiple channels (Demirguc-Kunt and Serven 
(2010)). These unintended effects are not evenly distributed 
across industries confirming that capital controls have 
distributional consequences (Rajan and Zingales (2003)) 
and are no free lunch (Forbes (2005a)).  
Our most important contribution is to identify the 
transmission channels and side effects on the real economy 
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of capital outflow controls as a financial stability tool. In 
contrast to the new economics literature that focuses 
exclusively on capital inflow controls (Korinek (2011)), 
outflow controls are a crisis management, rather than a 
crisis prevention tool (Demirguc-Kunt and Serven (2010)). 
As such, along with FX market operations, capital outflow 
controls are an important policy tool for emerging markets 
to mitigate the effects of the global financial cycle as 
monetary policy in advanced economies begins to 
normalize. Our paper is the first to analyze the channels of 
transmission and real effects of an episode of outflow 
controls. Ahnert, Forbes, Friedrich and Reinhardt (2018) 
show how macroprudential FX regulations unintentionally 
shift the FX vulnerability from local banks to local firms. 
We add to this literature by showing that outflow controls 
have unintended consequences on the real economy 
through multiple channels and, as such, are no free lunch. 
Emerging markets should therefore weigh the benefits to 
financial stability and costs to the real economy of capital 
outflow controls when dealing with the consequences of the 
global financial cycle.  
More broadly, we contribute to the literature of 
capital controls using microdata. Forbes (2003) studies the 
impact of Chilean encaje controls and documents increased 
financing costs for small traded firms. A more recent paper 
by Forbes, Fratzscher, Kostka and Straub (2016) shows 
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how investors re-allocated their portfolios away from 
Brazilian assets following a tax on capital inflows, as well 
as away from countries that seem more likely to impose 
similar restrictions. Focusing on the real effects, Alfaro, 
Chari and Kanczuk (2017) evaluate how capital controls 
affected firms' investment decisions in Brazil. Keller 
(2018) studies the impact of capital controls in Peru to 
show that local banks switched lending to domestic firms 
from local currency to dollars in order to hedge dollar 
deposits with real effects on firms’ employment because of 
tighter financial constraints. Andreasen, Bauducco and 
Dardati (2018) study the effects of capital controls on 
firms’ production, investment and exporting decisions 
using plant-level panel data from Chile. All of these papers 
analyze capital controls as a crisis prevention tool (i.e. 
controls on inflows) in contrast to our paper that analyzes 
capital controls as a crisis management tool (i.e. controls on 
outflows). Closest to our work are the papers of Tamirisa 
(1999) and Wei and Zhang (2007) who study the effects of 
capital inflow and outflow restrictions on trade for a large 
sample of countries across years. In contrast to these 
studies that rely on aggregate data and, as such, it is 
difficult to shed light on the mechanisms, we analyze 
customs data at the firm-product-destination level 
combined with detailed firms’ financial information and 
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exogenous benchmark industry characteristics that allow us 
to study the channels of transmission.   
Finally, we add to the literature that studies the 
role of imported inputs and credit constraints on firms’ 
export performance. It is well documented that imported 
inputs are of high quality and act as a channel of diffusion 
of technology, which in turn improves a firm’s productivity 
(Amiti and Konings (2007), Kasahara and Rodrigue (2007), 
Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2015)), product scope 
(Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2010)) and 
export performance (Bas (2012), Chevassus-Lozza, Gaigne 
and Mener (2013), Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015), Feng, Li 
and Swenson (2016)). A large literature also documents 
that access to external financing can be a source of 
comparative advantage in the presence of financial frictions 
(Kletzer and Bardhan (1987)). This is particularly 
important for firms’ exporting activities because exporters 
face additional costs when serving foreign markets as 
compared to firms serving only the domestic economy 
(Muuls (2008), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Amiti and 
Weinstein (2011), Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl and 
Wolfenzon (2015), Manova, Wei and Zhang (2015)). Our 
contribution is to identify the potency of each channel – 
trade and financial – when both are operational. As such, 
our paper informs on the policy responses when both 
channels differently affect the real economy.  
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2. Institutional Background  
Following the failure of the Greek parliament to elect a 
President of the Republic in December 2014, general 
elections in January 2015 brought into power a coalition 
government of the radical left party of SYRIZA with the 
smaller right-wing party of “Independent Greeks”40. Both 
parties had fiercely opposed the economic adjustment 
program, which had been agreed by previous governments 
with the troika of international lenders (European Central 
Bank, International Monetary Fund and EU member states) 
following the bailout of the Greek sovereign in May 2010. 
Lengthy negotiations and increased uncertainty over a new 
bailout plan and Greece’s future within the Eurozone drove 
depositors to withdraw 48.6bn euros during the first six 
months of 2015, accounting for more than one quarter of 
deposits of the Greek banking system. At the same time, 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) provided by the 
Bank of Greece to Greek banks increased drastically from 
45bn to 127bn euros (including Eurosystem funding) to fill 
the funding gap from the flight of deposits and the drying 
of the interbank market for Greek banks. At the time of 
imposition of capital controls in June 2015, deposits 
accounted for less than 50%, while central bank funding 
                                               
40 Priftis and Rousakis (2017) provide an overview of the 
latest stages of the Greek crisis.  
81 
 
(Eurosystem and ELA) accounted for more than 50% of 
total bank liabilities.  
The new bailout agreement between the Greek 
government and the troika was brought into a referendum, 
which was unexpectedly announced on June 27, 201541. As 
a response, the ECB refused to increase its loan limit for 
the provision of ELA to Greek banks on the same day, 
triggering the shutdown of banks (bank holiday) and the 
imposition of capital controls on June 28 201542. Capital 
controls can be broadly characterized as restrictions on 
capital transactions and comprised of three pillars: (a) 
measures to prevent outflows of funds abroad, (b) measures 
limiting cash withdrawals from banks and (c) measures to 
prevent the rapid decline of bank assets and liabilities (e.g. 
repayment of the remaining capital on bank loans). Despite 
these measures, there was no explicit restriction on the 
provision of credit by financial institutions. In addition, 
during the first phase of restrictions, all credit institutions 
                                               
41 Although the new bailout plan was rejected in the 
referendum of July 5, the Greek government came to an 
agreement with lenders for a new bailout program which 
envisaged financing of up to 86bn euros over a three year 
period in exchange of a programme of fiscal austerity 
measures and structural reforms. 
42 Although Bank of Greece is responsible for ELA 
funding, it is ECB’s decision to extend or restrict the ELA 
ceiling, i.e. the maximum amount of ELA available to 
Greek banks 
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operating in Greece, including branches of foreign banks, 
were forced to close until July 20, 2015, the Athens Stock 
Exchange remained closed and daily cash withdrawals 
were limited to a maximum of 60 euros per depositor per 
bank. No capital restrictions were applied to credit cards 
issued by foreign banks.  
During this phase, a special Banking Transactions 
Approval Committee (BTAC) was established to examine 
requests for transfers of funds abroad. The committee was 
responsible to gather, approve, reject or revise requests for 
transfer of funds abroad. Especially for importers, this was 
a particularly resource-intensive process, as firms were 
required to provide detailed documentation of past imports-
related capital transfers as well as invoices and other trade-
related documents. These documents were not easily 
accessible to firms, which further impaired their ability to 
import as compared to the period before capital controls. 
To reduce the burden of documentation requirements 
submitted to the centralized committee, special 
subcommittees were established in each financial 
institution to approve or reject submitted applications. The 
special subcommittees were responsible for the approval of 
transfers under a certain threshold. Transfers larger than 
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this threshold had to be approved by BTAC43. The purpose 
of these thresholds was to control the flow of funds abroad, 
but exogenously restricted the ability of importers to meet 
their contractual obligations with international suppliers. 
Following the agreement over the new bailout plan between 
the Greek government and the troika in August 2015 and a 
new round of parliamentary elections in September 2015, 
capital controls were significantly relaxed in January 201644. 
 
3. Data and Identification Strategy 
We combine financial information and 
administrative customs data at the product-destination level 
for all firms in Greece matched with pre-capital controls 
benchmark industry characteristics. We obtain export flows 
before and after capital controls from the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). There are approximately 
17,000 firms. The data report the universe of both intra-EU 
(Intrastat) and extra-EU (Extrastat) transactions at a 
                                               
43 The threshold of the total amount of transfers abroad by 
any individual firm was set initially at 100,000 euro per 
working day. This limit has been gradually increased to 
150,000 euros by August 2015 and to 250,000 by January 
2016. 
44 Nevertheless, capital controls are still effective at the 
time of writing of this paper (March 2019), although 
significantly relaxed as compared to the first six months of 
their imposition. 
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monthly frequency45. We take a number of steps to clean 
the data. First, we drop a handful of destinations that are 
not named for confidentiality reasons (e.g. military 
transactions). Second, we aggregate 5-digit SITC Rev.4 
products, which is the level of reporting, in 2-digit ISIC 
Rev.3 industries. Since there is no concordance table to 
map directly, we first map 5-digit SITC Rev.4 to 6-digit HS 
2007 products46 and then 6-digit HS 2007 products to 4-
                                               
45 Intrastat refers to the trading of goods between EU 
Member States, while Extrastat refers to the trading of 
goods with third countries. Firms that perform intra-EU 
transactions are liable for providing statistical information 
to ELSTAT, while firms that perform extra-EU transactions 
fill the Single Administrative Document (SAD) and submit 
it to the Customs Authorities. Documents are then 
transmitted to ELSTAT, which is responsible for compiling 
the total trade data within and outside the EU. Although 
Extrastat system records virtually all flows, EU National 
Authorities impose statistical thresholds for intra-EU trade, 
below which Intrastat declarations are not submitted by 
firms. ELSTAT has set exports' exemption reporting 
thresholds at 90,000 euros in 2014 and 2015. Data below 
the statistical threshold are still included in the Intrastat 
database and are estimates based on the Recapitulative 
Statements of intra-EU Deliveries and Acquisitions that all 
firms submit for fiscal purposes to the Ministry of Finance. 
Essentially, these are administrative documents that all 
firms are obliged to submit and thus can be considered of 
high quality. 
46 Table is from UN 
(https://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1). 
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digit ISIC Rev.3 industries47. We then aggregate at the 2-
digit level and restrict our attention to the manufacturing 
industry (codes 15-37). Benchmark characteristics of the 
manufacturing industry, Import Content of Exports and 
External Finance Dependence, vary at the 2-digit ISIC 
Rev.3 level and are obtained from the OECD STAN Input-
Output Database and Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel 
(2007) respectively48. Import Content of Exports is 
measured for Greece as of 2005. External Finance 
Dependence is constructed from data on all publicly listed 
US-based firms over the period 1980-1999. This is 
motivated by the fact that the US has the least frictionless 
financial system and, as such, the behavior of US firms 
reflects the optimal asset structure and exposure to external 
financing worldwide (Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Both 
benchmark characteristics are measured well before our 
policy shock and, by construction, are exogenous to 
individual firms belonging to the industry. Appendix Table 
A.1 summarizes the distribution of import and credit 
intensities across 18 manufacturing industries at the 2-digit 
ISIC Rev.3 level. 
                                               
47 Table is from WITS 
(http://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html). 
48 External Finance Dependence is obtained at the 3-digit 
ISIC Rev.2 level and is concorded by the authors as 
weighted averages at the 2-digit ISIC Rev.3 level to match 
with Import Content of Exports which is available only 2-
digit ISIC Rev.3 level. 
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 Because we analyze the adjustment of exports of 
industries at different levels of import and credit intensities 
within the same firm, we drop firms that export products of 
only one industry. Since we are also interested in the firms’ 
export supply decisions, we control for (unobservable) 
exports demand with destination fixed effects. As such, we 
further restrict our sample to include firms serving multiple 
destinations. Taken together, the firms that we drop 
represent less than 6% of the total value of exports before 
capital controls. We quantify the effect of capital controls 
on both margins of exports, estimating the following 
regression:   
 OPQR = /0 ∗ 	(T)A#95	U#>5*>5	#3	LMA#95?)V + /;∗ 	(LM5*9>8"	W=>8>4*	7*A*>6*>4*)V+	/N ∗	(U#>59#"?)V + XP + XR + CPQR 
 
In the above specification, f denotes a firm 
exporting products p that belong to an industry s and 
serving a destination d. Since firms do not necessarily 
export each product every month, the sample contains a 
number of intermittent export flows. To avoid introducing 
selection bias, we thus collapse the data into two time 
periods, t={pre , post}, where Pre={June 2014-November 
2014} and Post={June 2015-November 2015} and consider 
an export flow to be active at t if positive exports were 
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registered at any month during this period49. That way, we 
avoid potential estimation bias due to serial correlation 
concerns. The cross-section specification in first-
differences has the advantage of eliminating all time-
invariant heterogeneity at the firm, product and destination 
level (and a combination of those) as well as 
macroeconomic factors common to all firms and industries. 
Our Pre period is ideal for our analysis, because it captures 
the most politically and economically stable period during 
the Greek crisis since 201050. Depending on the margin of 
exports that we study, the dependent variable in the above 
specification denotes the log growth of exports 
(Y "#$(LMA#95?) 3A6) at the intensive margin and the 
percent change in the number of products (%Δ(# Products)) 
at the firm-sector-destination level, the percent change in 
the number of destinations (%Δ(# Destinations)) at the 
firm-sector level and the percent change in the number of 
product-destinations (%Δ(# Product-Destinations)) at the 
firm-sector level. We proxy with these adjustments the 
                                               
49 We drop December 2014 from our sample period 
because of the increased political uncertainty which was 
associated with the presidential election.  
50 During our Pre period, the yield of the 10-year Greek 
government bond was at its lowest level since the outburst 
of the Greek crisis in 2010.  
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extensive margin of exports51. The dependent variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the 
probability that outliers drive our findings. The terms XP	and	XR are firm and destination fixed effects 
respectively and CPQR  is the error term. 
The total value of exports was approximately 12 
billion euros, firms were exporting 2,328 products and were 
serving 205 destinations before capital controls. There were 
approximately 32,000 export trading relationships (i.e. 
product-destination pairs) before capital controls. Panel A 
in Appendix Table 2 provides information on benchmark 
industry characteristics. The import content of exports was 
on average 28% in the Greek manufacturing sector in 2005, 
similar to the rest of the EU. Panel B provides information 
on firms’ financial information.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 The Effect of Capital Controls on Exports Growth 
Table 2.1 reports the baseline estimates of outflow controls 
on exports growth. For identification, we analyze variation 
                                               
51 We opt in constructing these variables as percent 
changes, that is (#productspost - #productspre) / #productspre, 
as compared to log-differences, that is log(#productspost) – 
log(#productspre), in order to account for the fact that the 
number of products might equal 0 after capital controls and, 
as such, to allow for a more precise evaluation of the 
extensive margin of exports.  
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within the same firm and, as such, we include firm fixed 
effects in a first-differences model. Because we can 
introduce destination fixed effects, shifts in demand for 
Greek products are absorbed and the estimated effect 
reflects a firm’s exports supply decision. The potency of 
each channel – trade and financial – is proxied by the 
Import Content of Exports and External Finance 
Dependence. We include additional industry observables, 
such as physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, 
contract intensity, durability and trade credit intensity that 
the literature has documented to affect exports beyond and 
above the imported input content of exports and the 
external finance dependence.  
Table 2.1: Effect of Capital Controls on Exports Growth 
 
 
The estimates in Table 2.1 suggest that outflow 
restrictions have a negative effect on exports growth 
Capital Controls: June 2015
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Import Content of Exports -0.358** -0.348** -0.435** -0.434** 
0.13 0.128 0.175 0.174
External Finance Dependence -0.068 -0.073 -0.04 -0.045
0.084 0.084 0.084 0.082
Capital, Skills, Contract, Durability, Trade 
Credit Intensities no no yes yes
Destination FE no yes no yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.068
N 50,033 50,033 50,033 50,033
Note: The table presents results from difference-in-differences regression models at the firm-product-destination level. The time-window is
Pre={June 2014-November 2014} and Post={June 2015-November 2015}. Dependent variable is Δlog(Exports) , which denotes the log
growth of exports following the imposition of controls on capital outflows in June 2015. Additional sector-level control variables include
capital and skills intensity, contract intensity, durability and trade credit intensity. Capital and skills intensity are from Manova (2013),
contract intensity is from Nunn (2007), durability is from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) and trade credit intensity is from Fisman
and Love (2003) at the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 level and are concorded by the authors as weighted averages at the 2-digit ISIC Revision 3 level.
Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. Statistical significance is denoted as  .01***; .05**; .1*.
Δlog(Exports)
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through the trade channel. The coefficients of the financial 
channel, although negative, are not statistically different 
from zero. In all cases, the coefficients of the trade channel 
are statistically significant. This is robust when we control 
for shifts in exports demand (column 2) and additional 
industry observables (column 3). The effect is also 
economically relevant. Using the strictest of our 
specifications (column 4), a one standard deviation 
differential in an industry’s use of imported inputs is 
related to 5pp lower exports. This is a considerable effect 
relative to the -10% exports growth during capital controls.  
 Our main assumption is that exports adjust 
because of capital outflow controls. In other words, in the 
absence of capital controls, exports of products at different 
levels of import and credit intensities would have behaved 
in a similar way. In Table 2.2, we directly test for the 
validity of this assumption.  
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Table 2.2: Effect of Placebo Capital Controls on Exports 
Growth 
 
 We consider a placebo episode of outflow controls 
a year before the imposition of the actual restrictions with 
two time periods, t={pre-1, pre}, where Pre-1={June 2013-
November 2013} and Pre={June 2014-November 2014}. 
We choose these time periods to eliminate the possibility 
that seasonality of exports drives our results. We thus re-
run our baseline specifications as if placebo restrictions 
were imposed in June 2014. The results in Table 2.2 
suggest that there is no trend in exports of products at 
different levels of import and credit intensities before the 
policy shock. This suggests that our main identification 
assumption is valid and confirms that we can adequately 
employ a difference-in-differences estimation technique.  
 
4.2 The Role of External Financing for the Trade 
Channel 
Our main finding is that the trade channel was 
responsible for the adjustment of exports at the intensive 
Placebo Capital Controls: June 2014
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Import Content of Exports 0.012 0.022 -0.009 -0.004
0.136 0.135 0.156 0.157
External Finance Dependence -0.04 -0.046 -0.008 -0.015
0.084 0.085 0.135 0.131
Capital, Skills, Contract, Durability, Trade Credit Intensities no no yes yes
Destination FE no yes no yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.057
N 45,604 45,604 45,604 45,604
Δlog(Exports)
Note: The table presents results from difference-in-differences regression models at the firm-product-destination level. The time-window is
Pre={June 2013-November 2013} and Post={June 2014-November 2014}. Dependent variable is Δlog(Exports) , which denotes the log growth of
exports following the imposition of placebo controls on capital outflows in June 2014. Additional sector-level control variables include capital and
skills intensity, contract intensity, durability and trade credit intensity. Capital and skills intensity are from Manova (2013), contract intensity is from
Nunn (2007), durability is from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) and trade credit intensity is from Fisman and Love (2003) at the 3-digit ISIC
Revision 2 level and are concorded by the authors as weighted averages at the 2-digit ISIC Revision 3 level. Standard errors are clustered at the sector
level. Statistical significance is denoted as  .01***; .05**; .1*.
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margin. In other words, capital outflow controls imposed to 
firms a significant cost to import inputs which in turn 
affected exports at the intensive margin. One concern with 
this finding is whether the trade channel is adequately 
disentangled from the financial channel. In the aftermath of 
outflow controls, it is very likely that foreign exporters 
were a lot less willing to sell to Greek firms on open 
account and requested bank guarantees or cash in advance 
to settle transactions. In order to settle transactions, before 
goods are shipped, Greek importers might have applied for 
letters of credit or loans from their banks in order to pay for 
the imported inputs. Importers therefore had likely 
difficulties importing goods purely because of a decrease in 
the provision of banking services. In that case, we falsely 
attribute the estimated effect to the trade channel. In that 
case, the policy prescription should be very different and 
include the direct liquidity injection in the banking system 
rather than the relaxation of outflow restrictions. 
However, we show that the financial channel does 
not confound with the trade channel. In the run-up to 
outflow controls and during the bank run in the first six 
months of 2015, Greek banks came under intense pressure. 
The confidence to a banking sector that was close to its 
collapse was eroded and firms became much less dependent 
on domestic banking services. As Figure 2.4 suggests, 
firms appear to have been stockpiling cash reserves out of 
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the Greek banking system and in foreign banks since the 
outburst of the Greek crisis in 2010. This was intensified in 
the period before the outflow controls. Having increased 
their cash buffer in foreign banks, firms were aiming to 
alleviate the effects of possible outflow restrictions on their 
daily operations. In other words, firms appear to have self-
insured against the risk of changes in government policy by 
changing their cash reserves strategy. However, of the 47% 
of SMEs that have changed and adopted a new cash 
reserves strategy, more than half were retaining only a 
limited amount of cash abroad (National Bank of Greece 
Survey (2016)). This implies that the cash buffer was 
sufficient to more likely cover export-related costs in the 
short-run (e.g. paying salaries, freight and insurance) rather 
than in the long-run (e.g. product customization, set up and 
maintain an international distribution network) and, as 
such, alleviate the effect of capital controls on the intensive 
rather than the extensive margin of exports. This cash-
based channel is also supported in Priftis and Rousakis 
(2017) who analyze the behavior of Greek households 
before the imposition of capital outflow controls.  
To provide formal evidence on this cash-based 
channel, we start by showing that the financial channel 
does not confound with and is well disentangled from the 
trade channel by exploiting a unique institutional feature of 
the capital outflows regulation. For public safety purposes, 
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certain products were exempted from outflow restrictions. 
In particular, importing medicines, fuel and food products 
was not subject to submitting documentation that justifies 
the transfer of funds abroad. There were hardly any 
restrictions in the importing process of these products and, 
as such, they serve as a placebo group for the products that 
were subject to capital controls. Because of this 
institutional feature, the trade channel of products not 
subject to the restrictions effectively shuts down. We can 
therefore conduct a counterfactual exercise and isolate the 
trade from the financial channel.      
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Figure 2.4: Cash Reserves in Foreign Banks 
 
  
 
      
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
  
 
      
        
  
 
        
        
        
        
       
We do that in Table 2.3. We re-run our baseline 
regressions by splitting our sample into exempted and 
restricted products. The coefficient of the trade channel for 
the exempted products is not statistically significant. The 
coefficient of the trade channel for the restricted products 
is statistically significant and economically more relevant 
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as compared to the coefficient in column 4 of Table 2.1. 
This suggests that the adjustment of exports at the intensive 
margin is driven by the lack of imported inputs rather than 
credit factors.  
 
Table 2.3: Falsification Test: The Trade Channel of 
Products Not Subject to Capital Controls 
 
 
Although this exercise suggests that the two 
channels are well disentangled, an important concern is that 
the exempted products might differ from the restricted 
products exactly in their dependence on external finance. In 
other words, if the exempted products are relatively less 
credit-intensive, then the trade channel would still mask the 
effect of credit factors. In this case, our identification 
strategy would still not convincingly separate the effects on 
exports arising from changes in imported inputs and 
changes in external financing conditions. Indeed, only by 
Exempted Restricted
[1] [2]
Import Content of Exports 0.89 -0.522** 
1.098 0.226
External Finance Dependence -0.574 -0.103
0.88 0.072
Capital, Skills, Contract, Durability, Trade Credit Intensities yes yes
Destination FE yes yes
Firm FE yes yes
Adj. R2 0.089 0.065
N 8,671 41,036
Note: The table presents results from difference-in-differences regression models at the firm-product-destination level. The time-window is Pre={June 2014-
November 2014} and Post={June 2015-November 2015}. Dependent variable is Δlog(Exports), which denotes the log growth of exports following the
imposition of controls on capital outflows in June 2015. Exempted are medicines, fuel and food products, which correspond to codes 54, 3 and 0 in the SITC
Revision 4 classification. Additional sector-level control variables include capital and skills intensity, contract intensity, durability and trade credit intensity.
Capital and skills intensity are from Manova (2013), contract intensity is from Nunn (2007), durability is from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) and
trade credit intensity is from Fisman and Love (2003) at the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 level and are concorded by the authors as weighted averages at the 2-digit
ISIC Revision 3 level. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. Statistical significance is denoted as  .01***; .05**; .1*.
Δlog(Exports)
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eyeballing the external finance dependence of the relevant 
exempted industries in Appendix Table A.1, this seems to 
be a valid concern since the dependence of food products 
on external financing lies on the left tail of the distribution.   
We address this issue by analyzing within-industry 
variation across firms’ credit constraints52. In other words, 
we compare two firms that export products of the same 
import-intensive sector (and, as such, are equally subject to 
the trade channel) but are differentially dependent on 
domestic banking services. If the financial channel is 
operational, it must be captured at the firm-level. In other 
words, the effect of the financial channel on the intensive 
margin of exports will be picked up by our coefficients in a 
model where firms differ only to the extent they use 
domestic banking services. Formally, we estimate the 
following model:  
                                               
52 A downside of our data is that firms are marked with a 
unique numerical identifier. This is not a problem in our 
baseline regressions since we analyze within-firm variation. 
We retrieve a firm’s identity by matching with a second 
administrative dataset that reports the same information at 
the same level of disaggregation and overlaps with our 
anonymized database. We access this dataset through the 
Bank of Greece. This identified dataset has been extracted 
from ELSTAT's intra-EU and extra-EU databases, but at an 
earlier point in time as compared to the anonymized dataset 
and therefore reports fewer transactions because of 
subsequent revisions by the Statistical Authority. The 
precise steps to match the two datasets can be made 
available upon request. 
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 Y "#$(LMA#95?)PQR= /0 ∗ 	(J=$ℎ − TU	#3	LMA#95?)V∗ (W=9)	Uℎ89845*9=?5=4)P + XP + XRV+ CPQR  
 
In the above specification, High-IC of Exports is 
dummy equal 1 if an industry’s dependence on imported 
inputs is above the median industry, 0 otherwise. We 
consider a number of pre-determined (as of 2013) bank 
observables as Firm Characteristic to measure dependence 
on domestic banking services. This specification allows us 
to include a set of destination-sector fixed effects to fully 
control for shifts in export demand that are destination- and 
industry-specific.  
In Table 2.4, we start by considering the role of 
bank guarantees. It has been shown that bank guarantees 
play an important role in international trade (Niepmann and 
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017)) and this channel is likely to be 
operational in the aftermath of capital controls in Greece. 
As discussed above, foreign exporters were likely to accept 
bank guarantees and letters of credit instead of open 
account in order to settle transactions. We obtain 
information on firm’s dependence on bank guarantees at 
the firm-bank level from the Bank of Greece and we 
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aggregate this information at the firm-level53. The 
coefficient in column 1 is not statistically different from 
zero suggesting that the bank guarantees channel does not 
confound with the trade channel.  
Table 2.4: The Role of External Financing for the Trade 
Channel 
 
However, because banks were already weak in the 
run-up to outflow controls, it is likely that foreign banks 
increased their fees to accept guarantees, on behalf of their 
customers, from Greek banks or maybe even refused to 
accept them at all. Importers were then left to pay cash in 
advance and might have turned to their banks to ask for 
regular loans. A decrease in the provision of credit 
therefore, as Figure 2.2 suggests, would induce an 
adjustment in imported inputs and as a result an adjustment 
in exports. In other words, the trade channel might mask 
                                               
53 Unfortunately, the database does not distinguish which 
guarantees are trade-related and which are not. As a result, 
we treat all bank guarantees as trade-related guarantees.   
Bank 
Guarantees
Short-Term 
Debt/Liabilities
Short-Term 
Debt/Sales
Inventories
/Sales
Cash Conversion 
Cycle Collateral
1 2 3 4 5 6
High Import Content of Exports * Firm's Dependence 0.008 -0.379 0.018 0.158 0.001 0.275
0.018 0.422 0.203 0.311 0.001 0.185
Destination * Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
N 11,347 11,347 11,347 11,347 11,347 11,347
Δlog(Exports)
Note: The table presents results from difference-in-differences regression models at the firm-product-destination level. The time-window is Pre={June 2014-November 2014} and
Post={June 2015-November 2015}. Dependent variable is Δlog(Exports) , which denotes the log growth of exports following the imposition of controls on capital outflows in June
2015.High Import Content of Exports is a dummy equal 1 if sector's dependence on imports is above the median sector. Each column uses a different measure of Firm's Dependence.
In column 1, Bank Guarantees is firm's dependence on log bank guarantees as of 2013. In column 2, Short-TermDebt/Liabilities is the share of firm's short-term bank credit to total
liabilities as of 2013. In column 3, Short-Term Debt/Sales is the share of firm's short-term bank credit to total sales as of 2013. In column 4, Inventories/Sales is the share of firm's
inventory investment to total sales as of 2013. In column 5,Cash Conversion Cycle is the length in days between the moment a firm pays for its raw materials and the moment it is
paid for the sale of its final output as of 2013. In column 6,Collateral is the share of firm's fixed assets (land, buildings and machines) to total assets as of 2013. All measures are
constructed from balance sheet and income statement items except for Bank Guarantees that is from the credit register of the Bank of Greece. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. Statistical significance is denoted as  .01***; .05**; .1*.  
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the effect of the bank credit channel. To formally test for 
that, we construct four measures of a firm’s dependence on 
bank credit. These measures are standard in the literature. 
We consider the ratio of short-term debt over total 
liabilities (column 2) and over total sales (column 3). None 
of these are statistically significant when we interact them 
with the dummy of an import-intensive industry. As 
alternative measures of credit constraints, we consider the 
ratio of inventories over sales (column 4) and the cash 
conversion cycle (column 5). The first measure calculates 
the working capital firms require to maintain inventories 
and meet external demand. The second measure estimates 
the length in days between the moment a firm pays for its 
raw materials and the moment it is paid for the sale of its 
final output. The higher the measures are, the greater the 
dependence on external capital54. Columns 4 and 5 confirm 
that none of these proxies are statistically significant, which 
in turn suggests that the banks credit channel does not 
confound with the trade channel.  
A final concern with these findings has to do with 
the foreign bank credit channel. In other words, firms might 
have turned to their foreign banks exploiting existing 
lending relationships to ask for credit and pay cash in 
advance for their imported inputs. In that case, the trade 
                                               
54 Both measures are motivated from Raddatz (2006). 
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channel would still mask the effects of the financial 
channel. Because we do not observe a firm’s outstanding 
debt from foreign banks, we use the ability of a firm to 
borrow as this is proxied by a firm’s available collateral. 
Intuitively, a firm with more collateral would borrow 
relatively more from a foreign bank. In column 6, we use 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as a firm’s ability to 
raise external financing. We construct the ratio as the sum 
of land, buildings and machines over a firm’s total assets. 
The higher the ratio is, the greater the ability of a firm to 
raise external financing. The coefficient of the interaction is 
again not statistically significant. Taken together, these 
results suggest that credit factors do not drive the 
adjustment of exports at the intensive margin in the 
aftermath of capital outflow controls. In other words, credit 
factors do not confound with the trade channel.   
To shed light on the cash-based mechanism, we 
next compare firms with and without foreign bank accounts 
that export the same import-intensive products. In other 
words, we ask whether firms that were stockpiling cash 
reserves in foreign banks before capital controls did better 
in terms of exports at the intensive margin during capital 
controls. In line with survey evidence (National Bank of 
Greece Survey (2016)), we claim that this cash buffer 
abroad was only sufficient to cover the short-run export-
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related costs that are most likely associated with the 
intensive margin of exports.   
 
Table 2.5: Exports of Firms with Foreign Bank Accounts 
     
 Table 2.5 presents our results. In column 1, we 
interact a dummy for an import-intensive industry with a 
dummy for a firm that holds a foreign bank account as of 
2013. It is crucial to use this information as of 2013 in 
order to control for the endogenous response of firms to 
open accounts with foreign banks both during the bank run 
and in the aftermath of capital outflow controls. 
Unfortunately, this dummy is available to us only for 
approximately 70 listed firms as of 2013. With this caveat 
in mind, the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Firms with foreign bank 
accounts did better in terms of exports of import-intensive 
Size Foreign Ownership Net Exporter
[1] [2] [3] [4]
High Import Content of Exports * Foreign Bank Account 0.518** 0.188 3.291*** 2.301***
0.216 0.405 0.874 0.544
High Import Content of Exports * Foreign Bank Account * Firm's Characteristic 0.300** 0.083** 0.000** 
0.14 0.03 0.000
High Import Content of Exports * Firm's Characteristic 0.074 -0.164** -0.000** 
0.077 0.059 0.000
Destination * Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 713 713 713 713
Note: The table presents results from difference-in-differences regression models at the firm-product-destination level. In column 1, the time-window is Pre={June 2014-
November 2014} and Post={June 2015-November 2015}. Dependent variable is Δlog(Exports) , which denotes the log growth of exports following the imposition of controls
on capital outflows in June 2015. High Import Content of Exports is dummy equal 1 if sector's dependence on imports is above the median sector. Foreign Bank Account  is 
dummy equal 1 if firm has bank account with a foreign bank as of 2013. In column 2, Size is the log of firm's total assets as of 2013. In column 3, Foreign Ownership is the
percentage of firm's foreign equity as of 2013. In column 4, Net Exporter  is the difference of firm's exports and imports as of 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Statistical significance is denoted as  .01***; .05**; .1*.  
Δlog(Exports)
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products as compared to firms with no foreign bank 
accounts. Conditional on a foreign bank account, large 
firms (column 2), multinationals (column 3) and net 
exporters (column 4) did better in terms of exports as they 
were likely to have been stockpiling relatively more cash in 
the run-up to outflow controls55. We exploit these types of 
firms as a proxy for the amount of cash that firms were 
stockpiling in foreign banks before capital controls. In all 
cases, the coefficient of the triple interaction is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.   
 Taken together, these results suggest that the lack 
of imported inputs is responsible for the adjustment of 
exports at the intensive margin during capital outflow 
controls. The effect is not driven by credit factors, because 
firms hedge against the risk of imposition of capital 
outflow controls by changing their cash reserves strategy, 
stockpiling cash in foreign banks and becoming less 
dependent on the weak local banks before the policy shock. 
These findings inform on the policy responses required to 
mitigate the unintended consequences of capital outflow 
controls as a financial stability tool on the real economy. 
 
                                               
55 The idea of a net exporter is intuitive as these firms make 
relatively more of their revenues abroad and, as such, it is 
likely to retain relatively more cash in a foreign bank 
account as compared to a net importer. 
104 
 
4.3 The Extensive Margin 
We now turn our attention to the extensive margin of 
exports. This margin is associated with the large upfront 
costs that an exporter needs to cover. We follow Manova, 
Wei and Zhang (2015) and consider three models of the 
extensive margin. The percent change of products exported 
by a firm at the sector-destination level (i.e. %Δ(# 
Products)), the percent change of destinations served by a 
firm at the sector level (i.e. %Δ(# Destinations)) and the 
percent change of all trading relationships of a firm at the 
sector level (i.e. %Δ(# Product-Destinations)).  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
Table 2.6: The Extensive Margin 
 
The estimates in Table 2.6 suggest that a decline 
in credit provision has a negative effect on the range of 
products a firm exported and the range of destinations a 
firm served in the aftermath of capital outflow controls. 
Note that all models include a rich set of important industry 
observables and destination fixed effects to account for 
shifts in exports demand. In all models, the coefficients are 
statistically significant. They are also economically 
relevant. A one standard deviation in an industry’s 
dependence on external financing is related with 3pp lower 
growth of products exported, 4pp lower growth of 
destinations served and 5.3pp lower growth of a firm’s 
trading relationships. These results suggest that the 
By Firm-Sector-Destination
%Δ (#Products) %Δ (#Destinations) %Δ (#Product-Destinations) 
[1] [2] [3]
Import Content of Exports 0.014 0.233 0.206
0.166 0.163 0.171
External Finance Dependence -0.164*  -0.281*** -0.310***
0.089 0.054 0.045
Capital, Skills, Contract, Durability, Trade Credit Intensities yes yes yes
Destination FE yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.196 0.230 0.253
N 54,062 13,160 13,160
By Firm-Sector
Note: The table presents results from difference-in-differences regression models. The time-window is Pre={June 2014-November 2014} and Post={June 2015-November
2015}. In column 1, the dependent variable is %Δ (#Products) (product scope) at the firm-sector-destination level, which denotes the percent change in the number of products
exported. In column 2, the dependent variable is %Δ (#Destinations) (destination scope) at the firm-sector level, which denotes the percent change in the number of export
markets served. In column 3, the dependent variable is %Δ (#Product-Destinations) (product-destination scope) at the firm-sector level, which denotes the percent change in the
number of products exported - export market served pairs. Additional sector-level control variables include capital and skills intensity, contract intensity, durability and trade
credit intensity. Capital and skills intensity are from Manova (2013), contract intensity is from Nunn (2007), durability is from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) and
trade credit intensity is from Fisman and Love (2003) at the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 level and are concorded by the authors as weighted averages at the 2-digit ISIC Revision 3
level. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. Statistical significance is denoted as  .01***; .05**; .1*.
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financial channel is the key driver behind the decrease in 
exports at the extensive margin.    
Next, we ask whether the cash buffer that firms 
were stockpiling in foreign banks was sufficient to cover 
the sunk costs of exports, such as customizing products and 
maintaining an international distribution network. Survey 
evidence suggests that the majority of firms were retaining 
only a limited amount of cash in foreign banks (National 
Bank of Greece Survey (2016)). As such, the cash buffer 
abroad might have not be sufficient to cover the sunk costs 
of exports that are mostly associated with the extensive 
margin. 
 
Table 2.7: The Extensive Margin of Exports of Firms with 
Foreign Bank Accounts 
 
We formally test this in Table 2.7. We create a 
dummy High External Finance Dependence which is equal 
to 1 if an industry’s dependence on external capital is above 
By Firm-Sector-Destination
%Δ (#Products) %Δ (#Destinations) %Δ (#Product-Destinations) 
[1] [2] [3]
High External Finance Dependence * Foreign Bank Account -0.364 -0.117 -0.012
0.24 0.187 0.371
Destination * Sector FE yes - -
Sector FE - yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.168 0.029 0.061
N 655 160 160
By Firm-Sector
Note: The table presents results from difference-in-differences regression models. The time-window is Pre={June 2014-November 2014} and Post={June 2015-November 2015}.
In column 1, the dependent variable is %Δ (#Products) (product scope) at the firm-sector-destination level, which denotes the percent change in the number of products exported.
In column 2, the dependent variable is %Δ (#Destinations)  (destination scope) at the firm-sector level, which denotes the percent change in the number of export markets served. In 
column 3, the dependent variable is %Δ (#Product-Destinations) (product-destination scope) at the firm-sector level, which denotes the percent change in the number of products
exported - export market served pairs. High External Finance Dependence is dummy equal 1 if sector's dependence on external financing is above the median sector. Foreign Bank 
Account is dummy equal 1 if firm has bank account with a foreign bank as of 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance is denoted as .01***;
.05**; .1*.
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the median industry and 0 otherwise. We interact this 
dummy with a firm dummy of having a foreign bank 
account as of 2013. The idea behind this interaction term is 
to check whether credit constraints were relatively less 
binding for firms with foreign bank accounts. Our estimates 
suggest that the existence of a foreign bank account was not 
sufficient to cover the sunk costs of exports. A firm 
decreased both the range of products it exported and the 
range of destinations it served. In other words, credit 
constraints were binding for all firms regardless of their 
cash reserves strategy prior the imposition of capital 
controls. This is an intuitive result. The extensive margin of 
exports is associated with large upfront costs that firms 
cannot cover with cash. Instead, firms turn to their banks to 
ask for loans and other relevant banking products (e.g. 
letters of credit). When trade-related banking products are 
more expensive or not available, regardless of a firm’s cash 
management practices, exports adjust accordingly. These 
findings suggest that injecting liquidity directly into the 
banking system or recapitalizing the banking sector might 
mitigate the negative effects of capital outflow controls 
through the financial channel.   
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5. Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations of the Total 
Effect 
 We have computed the elasticities of the trade and 
financial channels to the adjustment of exports after the 
imposition of capital outflow controls in Greece. In this 
section, we use these elasticities to perform a back-of-the-
envelope calculation of the contribution of each channel to 
the overall adjustment. To do so, following Paravisini, 
Rappoport, Schnabl and Wolfenzon (2015), we make the 
simplifying assumption that less import- and credit 
intensive industries (i.e. below the median industry 
respectively) do not adjust their exports throughout our 
sample period. As such, the estimated effects in Tables 2.1 
and 2.6 are driven only by a subset of industries, which are 
highly import- and credit-dependent. This assumption 
generates a conservative estimate of the total effect and 
should be treated as a lower bound.  
 The coefficient in column 4 of Table 2.1 implies 
that industries with import content of exports above the 
median industry reduce their exports by 43% after capital 
controls. These industries account for 71% of total exports 
before the policy shock. This means that the trade channel 
is responsible for 31% of the overall exports adjustment at 
the intensive margin. Of course, other determinants are also 
related to the within-firm exports adjustment after capital 
controls, such as a firm’s management practices and 
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demand for Greek products. Failure to control for these 
factors would severely bias our estimates. We isolate the 
supply-side response of firms and show that the trade 
channel has a first-order effect at the intensive margin of 
exports.  
 The coefficient in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2.6 
imply that industries that are dependent on external finance 
above the median industry reduce their product scope by 
16%, their destination scope by 28% and the universe of 
their export trading relationships by 31%. These industries 
account for 33% of all products exported, 87% of all 
destinations served and 34% of all export trading 
relationships before capital controls. This means that the 
financial channel explains 5% of the adjustment of the 
products exported, 25% of the adjustment of the 
destinations served and 11% of the adjustment of product-
destination pairs.  
 
6. Conclusion 
As Helene Rey puts it, it is necessary to rigorously 
assess the effect of capital outflow controls on financial 
stability along with their side effects on the real economy 
(Rey, 2013). We take a first step to this direction and 
analyze an episode of capital outflows regulation in Greece 
in June 2015. Our most important contribution is to identify 
the transmission channels and real side effects of outflow 
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controls for financial stability purposes. Our main message 
is that although outflow controls help to restore financial 
stability, they have unintended effects on the real economy 
through multiple channels. Similar unintended effects are 
related to FX market operations (Ahnert, Forbes, Friedrich 
and Reinhardt (2018)). As such, it is crucial to weigh the 
benefits to financial stability against the costs to the real 
economy when dealing with the consequences of the global 
financial cycle. This is particularly timely as monetary 
policy in advanced economies begins to normalize. 
Identifying the transmission channels through which the 
effects manifest themselves is crucial to design policy 
responses. Outflow controls restrict a firm’s ability to pay 
for imported inputs and affect the availability of bank 
credit. We show that the decrease in imported inputs (the 
trade channel) is the main driver behind the decrease in 
exports at the intensive margin, while credit constraints (the 
financial channel) are the key driver behind the decrease in 
exports at the extensive margin. As such, both loosening 
the regulation and recapitalizing the banking sector might 
alleviate the real side effects of such policy. Overall, we 
show that capital outflows controls have unintended real 
consequences as a crisis management and financial stability 
tool (Demirguc-Kunt and Serven (2010)), which are not 
evenly distributed across firms and industries (Rajan and 
Zingales (2003)) and are no free lunch (Forbes (2005a)).  
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B Appendix 
B.1 Industry Characteristics 
Table B.1: Industry Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ISIC Rev. 3 Industry
Import Content of 
Exports
External Finance 
Dependence
C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 15.6% -16.1%
C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 20.5% -9.9%
C20 Wood and products of wood and cork 26.4% -3.0%
C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 22.3% -17.7%
C23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 67.9% 1.3%
C24 Chemicals and chemical products 32.3% -11.4%
C25 Rubber and plastics products 27.0% 4.2%
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products 16.6% -21.1%
C27 Basic metals 44.7% -13.4%
C28 Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment 32.6% -13.3%
C29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c 28.5% -1.7%
C30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 17.8% 34.1%
C31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 32.3% 10.8%
C32 Radio, television and communication equipment 17.7% 24.0%
C33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 27.5% 35.3%
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 32.7% -9.1%
C35 Other transport equipment 28.8% -2.0%
C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling 19.8% -3.4%
Note: The table presents Import Content of Exports and External Finance Dependence measures at the 2-digit ISIC Revision 3 sector level. Import Content of
Exports is defined as the share of total imported intermediated inputs used in the production of an industry's gross exports in Greece in 2005 and is obtained by
the OECD STAN Input-Output Database. External Finance Dependence is defined as the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow from
operations and corresponds to the median level of investment needs for ISIC sectors in the U.S. in period 1980-1999. External Finance Dependence is obtained
from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) at the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 level and is concorded by the authors as weighted averages at the 2-digit ISIC Revision 
3 level.
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B.2 Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median S.D. N
Import Content of Exports 0.28 0.27 0.12 18
External Finance Dependence -0.01 -0.03 0.17 18
Physical Capital Intensity 0.07 0.07 0.01 18
Human Capital Intensity 1.04 1.07 0.15 18
Contract Intensity 0.54 0.50 0.16 18
Durability 0.65 0.84 0.39 18
Trade Credit Intensity 0.09 0.09 0.01 18
Log(Bank Guarantees) 3.12 0.00 4.18 11,374
Short-Term Debt/Total Liabilities 0.32 0.29 0.21 11,374
Short-Term Debt/Total Sales 0.34 0.19 0.50 11,374
Inventories/Total Sales 0.30 0.23 0.29 11,374
Cash Conversion Cycle 190.75 165.79 174.48 11,374
Collateral (Fixed Assets/Total Assets) 0.73 0.70 0.34 11,374
Note: The table presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical specifications.
Panel A: Industry-level Characteristics
Panel B: Firm-level Financial Information
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Chapter 3 
 
FINANCIAL REGULATION, FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 
AND TRADE INTEGRATION 
 
Joint with Elias Papaioannou and Jose-Luis Peydro 
 
 
1. Introduction   
We investigate the causal relationship between 
financial integration and trade integration. Departing from 
the standard Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) paradigm, where 
international trade and international capital flows are 
substitutes, we test for the predictions of various theoretical 
models on finance and trade. For example, Kemp (1966) 
shows that trade and capital flows are complements with 
causality running from finance to trade. A similar result is 
also shown in Jones (1967) and Inada and Kemp (1969), 
who establish that due to differences in technology, factors 
of production are internationally mobile. Helpman and 
Razin (1978) also show that when trade in securities is 
allowed in their model, trade in goods carries over to 
uncertain environments. However, the OLS estimates that 
are generated from a simple regression of financial 
integration on trade integration suffer from reverse 
causation. Antras and Caballero (2009) show that in the 
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presence of financial frictions in underdeveloped countries, 
which are the source of capital misallocation across sectors, 
trade integration increases financial integration. The idea is 
that trade reduces the misallocation problem by re-
organizing the domestic production and, as such, increases 
the return on capital. As a result, it increases the incentive 
of capital to flow into these countries. 
Our contribution is to use a unique quasi-natural 
experiment in order to identify the causal effect of financial 
integration on trade integration. We exploit quasi-natural 
experiment variation at the country-pair level from the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in the EU in period 
1999-2003. FSAP was a set of reforms in banking, 
insurance and securities markets, which harmonized EU 
member states’ financial regulation, integrated financial 
markets and reduced the costs of cross-border financial 
intermediation. It included 29 legislative acts, of which 2 
Regulations and 27 Directives. Unlike Regulations that 
imply immediate effect across EU countries, Directives 
become enforceable only after member states pass domestic 
legislation to transpose EU law. The transposition into 
national law can be slow, often beyond the EU official 
deadlines. Although the timing of the transposition of a 
Directive is an endogenous decision in a member state, it is 
plausibly orthogonal to the timing of the transposition of 
the same Directive in another member state. In other words, 
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we exploit within-country-pair across-time variation in 
regulatory harmonization of EU financial legislation to 
proxy for the similarity of countries’ financial 
intermediation structures. It seems also reasonable to 
assume that harmonization of financial intermediation 
affects trade integration primarily through banking 
integration.  
Exploiting this experimental setting, we first 
update and expand the index used in Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Papaioannou and Peydro (2010, 2013) by constructing two 
variants of this index to capture the speed and intensity of 
regulatory harmonization. As such, for the first time, we 
shed light on whether the speed and intensity of regulatory 
harmonization matters for de-facto financial integration. 
Our estimates suggest that maximal financial regulation 
(i.e. regulation that leaves no discretion to member states 
over the rules to be implemented) increases financial 
integration. This is an important finding that speaks directly 
to the importance of a level playing field in financial 
regulation. We proceed by studying the effect on trade 
integration and find that financial integration has no 
aggregate effect on bilateral trade among 17 industrial 
economies56. Both our reduced-form and panel estimates 
                                               
56 Our sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
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suggest that exogenously driven financial integration does 
not increase bilateral international trade. Motivated by this 
finding, we build on Fisman and Love (2004, 2007) and 
study potential heterogeneous effects based on an industry's 
growth opportunities. Unlike previous studies, As Fisman 
and Love (2007) discuss, the assumptions of the seminal 
work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) are related more to an 
industry's response to global shocks rather than to inherent 
(technological) financial dependence57. However, unlike 
Fisman and Love's (2004) growth opportunities proxy that 
does not vary over time, we construct a time-varying 
measure, because growth opportunities that arise from 
global shocks are likely to be temporal rather than 
permanent. We perform our analysis on a highly 
disaggregated level of sector classification of 387 
                                                                              
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
57 A related issue with measures previously employed in 
the literature is whether “external finance dependence” 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998) actually measures dependence 
on outside trade-related capital. Ahn, Amiti and Weinstein 
(2011) show that by using cash flow as a proxy for internal 
finance, the Rajan-Zingales measure is by construction not 
correlated to trade finance used by exporters. In other 
words, banks cannot confirm whether a loan is used for 
domestic sales or for exports. This is in line with the 
discussion in Feenstra, Li and Yu (2014) that banks cannot 
follow a loan once it enters a firm. The same assumption, 
but in a different content, is also made in Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990). 
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manufacturing industries and find that industries that grow 
faster are the ones that reap the benefits of greater financial 
integration when it comes to international trade. We show 
that the industries trade more at both intensive and 
extensive margins of trade. Taken together, our most 
important contribution is to solve a challenging 
endogeneity problem and show that bilateral financial 
integration implies greater trade integration with some 
industries winning and some industries losing from 
financial globalization.  
Our paper belongs to the literature that studies the 
role of financial development and credit constraints on 
international trade using rich micro datasets58 (e.g. Manova, 
2008; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; 
Chor and Manova, 2012; Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl 
and Wolfenzon, 2015; Muuls, 2015). However, none of 
these studies explicitly examine the role of financial 
globalization on trade integration. In contrast, consistent 
with causality running from trade to finance, Do and 
Levchenko (2007) and Braun and Raddatz (2008) show that 
higher export demand could lead to higher levels of credit 
domestically. Kalemli-Ozcan and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy 
(2010) also provide evidence on a similar mechanism 
                                               
58 Foley and Manova (2015) provide an excellent review of 
the literature that relies on aggregate data. 
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exploiting fluctuations in rainfall as exogenous variation in 
trade. Three related to ours papers are by Hale, Candelaria 
and Caballero (2019) and Michalski and Ors (2012) and 
Claessens, Hasib and van Horen (2017). Hale, Candelaria 
and Caballero (2019) examine how bank-to-bank linkages 
in the syndicated loan market reduce export risk and, thus, 
increase bilateral trade. Michalski and Ors (2012) exploit 
the U.S. interstate banking deregulation to show that banks 
present in two regions charge the appropriate risk 
premiums for trade-related projects and, as such, affect 
regional trade flows. In a similar fashion, Claessens, Hasib 
and van Horen (2017) show that financial integration in the 
form of foreign bank presence expands available credit and 
overcomes information asymmetries, which in turn leads to 
higher exports. However, as theory predicts, a positive 
association between financial and trade integration does not 
necessarily imply causation. Unlike the previous studies, 
we undertake an instrumental variables approach to identify 
the causal effect of banking integration on trade integration.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics   
2.1 Trade Integration   
We obtain data on bilateral trade flows at the 6-
digit Harmonized System (HS) classification from the UN 
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COMTRADE Database in period 1994-200659. 
Approximately every five years, UN revises classification 
of products by announcing an updated edition, where 
products change, merge or split. To avoid products entering 
and exiting our analysis, which could be misleading for the 
extensive margin of trade, we use UN conversion tables 
and map HS 1996 and HS 2002 back to HS 1992 to use it 
as our classification benchmark year60. When we study 
aggregate effects, all products are aggregated at the 
country-pair-year level. Instead, when we study 
heterogeneous effects at the country-pair-industry-year 
level, we map 6-digit HS 1992 products to 4-digit SIC 1987 
industries61. We then restrict our attention to the 
manufacturing sector, which corresponds to codes 2000-
3999. This leaves us with 387 unique industries at the 4-
digit level. Normally, within a given country-pair(-
industry-year), same trade flows are reported twice as 
exports of one country and imports of the other. These 
values may differ, typically by a small amount, due to 
differences in reporting practices of the two countries. We 
construct trade (at the intensive margin) from country i to 
                                               
59 We start our sample period in 1994, because the data 
before that year are contaminated with issues regarding 
VAT fraud (Baldwin, 2006; Baldwin and Di Nino, 2006). 
60 The next edition was HS 2007, which is outside our 
sample period. 
61 The concordance table is from WITS 
(https://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html) 
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country j as the average of the corresponding real (deflated 
using the US price deflator) exports-imports as measure of 
a one directional trade flow and then measure trade 
integration as the trade value of the two countries by taking 
the average of both directional flows of the country-pair. 
We apply the same logic at the extensive margin as well. 
We construct trade from country i to country j as the 
average of the corresponding exported-imported goods as 
measure of a one directional trade flow and then measure 
trade integration as the goods traded between the two 
countries by taking the average of both directional flows of 
the country-pair. We match these data with industry-level 
information from the NBER Manufacturing Database62. In 
particular, we construct a benchmark measure to proxy for 
growth opportunities, which is defined as an industry's 
annual sales growth in period 1994-200663. Unlike Fisman 
and Love (2004), we construct a time-varying measure, 
because growth opportunities that arise from global shocks 
are likely to be temporal rather than permanent. We also 
construct time-varying proxies for factor intensities, that is 
we define an industry's capital intensity as the log of the 
                                               
62 We opt in employing the NBER Manufacturing Database 
to get information for 387 industries as compared to 
Compustat, because the latter leaves us with only 200 
industries at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. 
63 We deflate these series with the U.S. CPI index to 
account for price changes. 
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real capital stock to total employment and skills intensity as 
one minus the share of production employment to total 
employment.  
Figure 3.1: Evolution of Trade Integration 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
Figure 3.1 presents the evolution of trade 
integration among industrial countries. The blue line 
represents the intensive margin of trade, which is defined as 
the total bilateral assets and liabilities holdings. During our 
sample period 1994-2006, bilateral exports and imports 
have doubled from approximately 500 billion U.S. dollars 
to more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars. The red line represents 
the extensive margin of trade, which is defined as the sum 
of bilateral goods exported and imported. In other words, 
122 
 
for each country-pair and industry at the 4-digit SIC level, 
we count the number of 6-digit HS classification products 
traded bilaterally and then plot the total number of products 
in each year. Similar to the intensive margin, there was an 
increase in the products being traded among industrial 
countries in period 1994-2006.  
In Figure 3.2, we plot the average annual sales 
growth of all manufacturing industries at the 4-digit SIC 
level (387 industries), as well as the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the distribution. It is worth noting that the 
lowest tail of the distribution was growing by as much as -
30% in 2001, the upper tail recorded increased sales 
growth. Although the average sales growth of the 
manufacturing sector appears to be relatively stable over 
time, this masks important heterogeneity across industries.  
 
Figure 3.2: Industry Sales Growth Over Time 
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In figure 3.3, we plot the average annual sales 
growth of the tobacco (code 21) and furniture (code 25) 
industries. The plot suggests that industries respond to 
shocks only temporarily rather than in a permanent manner, 
which motivates the use of a time-varying measure of 
growth opportunities.       
 
Figure 3.3: Variation in Sales Growth Over Time 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
2.2 Banking Integration   
We match the trade data with information from the 
confidential version of the BIS Locational Banking 
Statistics (LBS), which reports assets and liabilities 
holdings of banks located in rich industrial economies 
(reporting economies) in other countries (vis-a-vis 
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countries)64. Data are supervisory and are collected by 
domestic monetary authorities, which are then passed to 
and centrally compiled by BIS. The data capture banks’ on-
balance sheet exposures and approximate for more than 
99% of the overall international exposure of a country's 
banking system (Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro, 
2013). Data include international bank-to-bank debt 
holdings, such as interbank deposits and loans. BIS does 
not distinguish between foreign direct and portfolio equity 
investments. Although foreign direct and portfolio 
investments have become more important after the late 
1990s (BIS, 2003a), standard banking activities still 
comprise the bulk of external asset and liability holdings 
                                               
64 In an effort to enhance its statistical offering to support 
monetary and financial stability analysis, the BIS has made 
part of the LBS publicly available. In addition to the 
positions of banks in all reporting countries on 
counterparties in individual countries and the positions of 
banks in individual reporting countries on all counterparties 
abroad, a matrix of reporting countries and counterparty 
countries is now disclosed as well. Despite the 
improvement, a significant part of the data that countries 
report to the BIS are classified as confidential and are not 
for publication (BIS, 2016). As BIS (2016) reports, for 15 
of the 44 countries that report, limited details are published 
and for the rest 29 for which more details are published, 
historical data are not shown. Thus, these confidentiality 
restrictions result in holes in the data BIS can make 
publicly available (BIS, 2016). For these reasons, we opt in 
working with the confidential version of the LBS. 
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(Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro, 2013). This 
makes the data suitable for our purposes. Because data are 
expressed in current U.S. dollars, we convert into constant 
U.S. dollars by deflating the series with the U.S. CPI index. 
We construct our quantity-based measure of banking 
integration between country i and country j as the average 
value of the real bilateral assets and liabilities holdings (i.e. 
stocks)65. Our sample includes 17 industrial economies, 
which are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
United Kingdom66. We plot the evolution of banking 
integration in period 1994-2006 in Figure 3.4. 
                                               
65 Importantly, following Baldwin (2006), our trade and 
banking integration measures are constructed as the 
average of the log values and not the log of the average 
values, as this could lead to biased estimates. The error in 
the calculation of bilateral flows (bank and trade) is getting 
larger the more unbalanced those bilateral flows are 
(Baldwin, 2006). Following Rose and Spiegel (2004), we 
do not standardize the banking integration measure with 
income or population characteristics, rather we explicitly 
control for the log of product income per capita and log of 
product population. 
66 We drop Luxemburg, because of extremely large cross-
border assets and liabilities holdings and Greece, because 
data are available from 2003. 
126 
 
Figure 3.4: Evolution of Banking Integration 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
 
 
2.3 Regulatory Harmonization 
We address the endogenous relationship between 
banking and trade integration by employing the unique 
“quasi-natural” experimental setting of adopting EU-wide 
legislation. The index is as in Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou 
and Peydro (2010, 2013) and reflects the harmonization in 
financial services as part of the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP) across EU member states in period 1999-
2003. Unlike Regulations, the gradual transposition of 
Directives into national law generates variation at the 
country-pair and year level, which is ideal for our analysis. 
We exploit the variation in the implementation of the same 
Directive by two different countries and define our 
structural measure of financial integration as  
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J2<^_ ,`-a = "> b (1 + dLe,-a,g)gh;igh0  
 
We update and extend the index of Kalemli-
Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro (2010, 2013) in two ways. 
First, since financial integration actually takes place when 
laws are implemented rather than transposed into national 
laws, we manually collect the universe of implementation 
dates of EU-Directives for each member state. Second, we 
construct two variants of the new index that reflect the 
speed and the intensity of regulatory harmonization. These 
improvements allow us to carefully track the 
implementation of financial regulation along with its speed 
and intensity. To do so, we combine data from the 
European Commission and data from the EUR-LEX portal, 
which is the official portal of all European Union laws. We 
retrieve detailed information on all 27 Directives, such as 
all relevant transposed legal acts and their official 
documents published at government Gazettes, dates of 
publication, notification dates of European authorities and 
actual implementation dates. When implementation dates 
are not available, we conduct an extensive manual search in 
official documents and legal acts, often available only in 
the national language to pick up the right dates. In case a 
member state presents multiple legal acts to transpose the 
same Directive, we collect information on both the earliest 
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and the latest implementation date to proxy for the speed of 
harmonization. Finally, we follow Enriques and Gatti 
(2008) taxonomy of EU Directives and distinguish between 
minimal and maximal harmonization. The idea behind this 
taxonomy is that with minimal harmonization, member 
states may impose stricter rules on top of what is the least 
harmonized guidelines. On the other hand, maximal 
harmonization promotes the idea of uniformity across 
member states, by transposing the rules devised in the 
Directive and leaving no room for discretion at the member 
state level67. We collect this information from the 
Directives’ official documents and assign a dummy 
“minimal” for Directives with only minimum 
requirements68. Out of 27 Directives, 23 imply minimal and 
4 imply maximal harmonization. We use this taxonomy to 
proxy for the intensity of financial regulation. Appendix 
Tables 2 and 3 present the updated and expanded index in 
the EU 15 countries69. Although a laborious task to 
manually collect this information, these indexes will help 
                                               
67 Two notable examples of maximal harmonization 
include the Directive 2002/65/EC on the distance 
marketing of financial services and Directive 2004/39/EC 
on the markets in financial instruments (MiFID). 
68 For example, Directive 2002/83/EC for life assurance 
allows member states to “lay down stricter rules for 
assurance undertakings authorized by its own competent 
authorities” (paragraph 28). 
69 The correlation between the various variants of the index 
is 99.8%. 
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us shed light on important questions for the design of 
financial regulation.  
In Figure 3.5, we plot the regulatory 
harmonization of financial intermediation measure along 
with banking integration for four country-pairs in Europe. 
In all cases, although there were international financial 
linkages among country-pairs, de-facto financial integration 
was relatively stable until 1999. Regulatory harmonization, 
which was designed to reduce barriers in financial 
legislation, spurred cross-border financial flows and 
increased banking integration. These plots suggest that the 
relationship between our de-jure measures of financial 
integration with our de-facto measure of financial 
integration is positive and strong.   
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Figure 3.5: Regulatory Harmonization and Banking 
Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
      
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
     
      
3. Identification   
As discussed above, we overcome the endogeneity 
issues between banking and trade integration by employing 
a measure of harmonization of financial intermediation 
across EU member states in period 1999-2003. We exploit 
the variation that arises from the gradual transposition of 
each of the 27 Directives of the Financial Services Action 
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Plan (FSAP) into national laws at the country-pair and year 
level as an exogenous component of banking integration. 
Formally, we estimate the following model:   
  j2`kT`l,-a = /0 ∗	J2<^_ ,`-,am0 + U#>59#"?,-,am0Γ+ X,- + Xa + C,-a 
 
This model serves as our first-stage regression. 
We make two assumptions regarding the validity of 
HARMON as an instrument. First, there is a strong 
relationship between regulatory harmonization and banking 
integration. This seems rather plausible, because the 
experimental setting of harmonizing a particular aspect of 
law (financial intermediation) EU-wide relates with 
outcomes in the same industry (banking industry). Second, 
conditional on other factors, the harmonization of financial 
services legislation affects international trade through 
increasing bilateral cross-border financial linkages. This is 
also a reasonable assumption, because the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) was designed to further 
develop a common market for the provision of financial 
services and spur financial flows in Europe. To isolate the 
impact of regulatory harmonization on banking integration, 
we control for macroeconomic characteristics (income per 
capita, population and indicator variables for membership 
in the EU and the Eurozone), as well as for time-invariant 
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country-pair-specific factors and global shocks with an 
extensive set of country-pair and year dummies. Finally, we 
allow for heteroskedastic and serially correlated errors for 
each country-pair by clustering at the country-pair level.     
At the aggregate level, we ask what the effect of 
increasing bilateral financial linkages is on trade integration 
at the country-pair level. Formally, we estimate the 
following model:  
 l<27L,-a = /0 ∗	j2`kT`l,-,am0 + U#>59#"?,-,am0Γ+ X,-5	 +	X,- + Xa + C,-a 
 
The dependent variable represents either the 
intensive or the extensive margin of trade integration. All 
right-hand side variables are lagged one year to account for 
the fact that banking integration is a quantity-based 
measure (stocks) and trade integration is a flow-based 
measure (flows). We include country-pair and year fixed 
effects and, crucially, we add a country-pair-specific linear 
time trend to account for unobserved dynamics in the 
banking integration of the country-pair (e.g. an upward or a 
downward trend). Finally, we produced t-statistics that are 
based on robust clustered standard errors by country-pair.   
We explore potential heterogeneous effects across 
industries from increased financial linkages on trade 
integration. As discussed above, following Fisman and 
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Love (2004, 2007), we focus on industries that differ with 
respect to how responsive are to global shocks (e.g. a 
global demand shock or an oil production shock). The 
assumptions in the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) are revisited in Fisman and Love (2007), who 
conclude that financial intermediaries allow firms to 
respond to these shocks rather than to grow in industries 
with an inherent dependence on external capital. To this 
end, we use an industry's annual sales growth as a proxy for 
responsiveness to global shocks. However, unlike Fisman 
and Love's (2004) growth opportunities measure which is 
time-invariant, we construct a time-varying measure as 
growth opportunities are likely to be temporal rather than 
permanent. Formally, we estimate the following model:     
 l<27L,-Va = /0 ∗ 	j2`kT`l,-,am0 ∗ o9_AAV,am0 + X,-a+	X,-V + XVa + C,-Va  
 
All right-hand side variables are again lagged one 
year. We isolate the effect of banking integration from 
other confounding factors by controlling for an exhaustive 
set of dummies at the country-pair-industry, country-pair-
year and industry-year level. The first set of dummies 
controls for hard-to-measure time-invariant country-pair-
specific comparative advantage in international trade. For 
example, a country may have a comparative advantage in 
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exporting leather products within a pair, despite its overall 
comparative advantage in exporting wood products. Since 
we exploit variation at the country-pair-industry level, these 
dummies are necessary to isolate the channel. The second 
set of dummies controls for time-varying country-pair-
specific factors that have been found to be important in 
standard gravity models of international trade (e.g. income 
and population characteristics). The third set of dummies 
controls for time-varying heterogeneity across industries. 
For example, to the extent that physical or human capital 
intensity varies over time within the same sector, the effect 
is isolated with the set of industry-year dummies. To allow 
for rather conservative inference, we follow Cameron, 
Gelbach and Miller (2011) and calculate the standard errors 
under multiway clustering at the country-pair and industry-
year level.   
 
4. Results 
4.1 First-Stage 
In Table 3.1 we examine whether regulatory 
harmonization has explanatory power on cross-border 
financial flows. All models control for country-pair and 
year fixed effects. As reported in column 1, the effect is 
positive and statistically significant at the 99\% confidence 
level. It is also economically relevant (0.18), suggesting 
that countries that transposed into domestic law the EU-
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wide regulatory harmonization policies on banking, 
insurance and capital markets became more financially 
integrated through international banking activities. In 
column 2, we add two time-varying bilateral measures to 
proxy for macroeconomic conditions and continue to 
control for country-pair and year fixed effects. Both the 
statistical and economic relevance remain unchanged. 
Since the regulatory harmonization policies took place 
starting in 1999, we re-run our specifications restricting the 
time window in period 1999-2006. Column 3 presents the 
results of this robustness test. Although the economic 
significant is somewhat smaller, the effect of harmonization 
on banking integration remains positive and highly 
statistically significant. Across all specifications, the first-
stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is greater than 
10, which serves as a rule of thumb for a weak instrumental 
variable. Taken together, our results suggest that a 
significant part of financial integration in Europe was 
driven by the harmonization of domestic policies in 
financial services.  
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Table 3.1: First-Stage: Harmonization and Banking 
Integration 
 
We now restrict our attention to two related issues 
and ask whether the speed and intensity of regulatory 
harmonization matter for the depth of financial integration. 
To this end, we exploit three variants of our benchmark 
index of harmonization, one that reflects the latest date of 
implementation of a Directive nationally, one that reflects 
the earliest date of implementation of a minimal Directive 
nationally and one that reflects the latest date of 
implementation of a minimal Directive nationally. The first 
variant aims to capture the speed at which national 
authorities transpose EU-wide legislation and, as a result, 
how fast they integrate with other member-states. The 
1999-2006
[1] [2] [3]
L1. Harmon. 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.13***
0.0005 0.0000 0.0005
3.6 4.4 3.57
GDP & Population Controls no yes yes
Country-Pair FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
First-stage F-score 14.55 17.51 11.29
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Within-R2 0.0374 0.1658 0.1179
N 1,546 1,546 1,069
Bank. Int.
Note: The table presents OLS estimates. In columns 1-2, the sample period is 1994-2006 and in
column 3, the sample period is 1999-2006. The dependent variable is Banking Integration
(BankInt) , which is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price
deflator) assets and liabilities holdings (stocks). Regulatory Harmonization (Harmon) is a
country-pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in European
Union, which is constructed as the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each 
EU Directive of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the
earliest date. Control variables include the log of the product GDP per capita and the log of the
product population of the two countries. All variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are
clustered at the country-pair level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics (in parentheses)
are reported below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01, **p <
0.05, *p < 0.1.
1994-2006
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second and third variants aim capture the intensity of 
regulatory harmonization, in other words the 
implementation of only the minimal requirements set out 
by a Directive. The estimated coefficients in panel A of 
Table 3.2 suggest that the speed of harmonization does not 
materially affect the depth of bilateral financial integration. 
In other words, despite the piecemeal transposition of an 
EU Directive by a member state, this does not seem to 
affect international financial integration. In contrast, the 
intensity of harmonization seems to matter for the depth of 
banking integration (panels B and C). The estimated effect, 
although highly statistically significant, is smaller 
suggesting that transposing only the minimal of the 
requirements set out by EU Directives leads to a lower 
level of bilateral financial integration. Overall, our results 
suggest that it is what is being transposed rather than when 
it is transposed that matters for financial integration. These 
novel results point to the importance of a level playing field 
in the harmonization of financial regulation.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
 
Table 3.2: Speed and Intensity of Harmonization 
 
 
1999-2006
[1] [2] [3]
Panel A: Speed
L1. latest -Harmon. 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.13***
0.0004 0.0000 0.0008
3.61 4.36 3.42
First-stage F-score 14.71 17.68 10.45
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Within-R2 0.0380 0.1654 0.1162
Panel B: Intensity
L1. earliest-minimal -Harmon. 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.10***
0.0011 0.0007 0.0022
3.35 3.49 3.12
First-stage F-score 12.94 11.18 9.42
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Within-R2 0.0253 0.1517 0.1118
Panel C: Speed & Intensity
L1. latest-minimal -Harmon. 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.10***
0.001 0.0009 0.004
3.36 3.39 2.93
First-stage F-score 12.98 10.79 8.33
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Within-R2 0.0255 0.1509 0.1100
GDP & Population Controls no yes yes
Country-Pair FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
N 1,546 1,546 1,069
Note: The table presents OLS estimates. In columns 1-2, the sample period is 1994-2006 and in
column 3, the sample period is 1999-2006. The dependent variable is Banking Integration (BankInt) , 
which is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets
and liabilities holdings (stocks). In panel A, Regulatory Harmonization (latest-Harmon)  is a country-
pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in European Union, which
is constructed as the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU Directive of
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the latest date. In panel B,
Regulatory Harmonization (earliest-minimal-Harmon) is a country-pair time-varying measure of the
minimal harmonization of financial intermediation in European Union, which is constructed as the log
of one plus the sum of 23 indicator variables, one for each minimal EU Directive of the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the earliest date. In panel C, Regulatory 
Harmonization (latest-minimal-Harmon) is a country-pair time-varying measure of the minimal
harmonization of financial intermediation in European Union, which is constructed as the log of one
plus the sum of 23 indicator variables, one for each minimal EU Directive of the Financial Services
Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the latest date. All variables are lagged one year.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics are
reported below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
Bank. Int.
1994-2006
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4.2 Aggregate Effects 
We start by analyzing aggregate effects at the 
country-pair level. Our starting point is to study the 
relationship between the measure of financial sector 
harmonization and trade integration. Table 3.3 presents the 
results from these reduced-form OLS estimates. In columns 
1-3, we restrict our attention to the intensive margin of 
trade, which is defined as the average of the logs of 
bilateral real exports and imports. All models include a set 
of country-pair and year dummies to account for time-
invariant country-pair characteristics and common shocks 
respectively, as well as country-pair-specific linear time 
trends to account for unobserved dynamics at the country-
pair level. As a result, the coefficients of interest are 
identified from variation at the country-pair-year level. In 
column 1, we document a statistically insignificant 
relationship between harmonization and trade integration at 
the intensive margin. In fact, this relationship is far from 
being statistically meaningful and it remains so when we 
further control for macroeconomic conditions (column 2) 
and indicator variables for EU and Eurozone membership 
(column 3). When we look at the extensive margin, which 
is defined as the average of the logs of bilaterally exported 
and imported goods, we again fail to detect any meaningful 
relationship. Taken together, and regardless of the 
specification considered, the relationship between our 
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structural measure of financial integration and trade 
integration is not significant at the aggregate level and this 
holds for both intensive and extensive margins of trade.   
In Table 3.4, we examine the role of our de-facto 
measure of banking integration in explaining trade 
integration. To mitigate concerns regarding reverse 
causality, as well as to reconcile our stocks-based measure 
of banking integration with our flows-based measure of 
trade integration, all regressors enter with one year lag in 
our specifications. For both margins of trade, the estimated 
coefficients are positive suggesting that an increase in 
international financial linkages leads to an increase in real 
linkages. However, the effect is not statistically significant. 
Conditional on all fixed effects and country-pair-specific 
linear time trends, these findings imply that there is no 
meaningful association between banking and trade 
integration at the aggregate level.    
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Table 3.3: Aggregate Effects: Harmonization and Trade 
Integration 
 
Table 3.4: Aggregate Effects: Banking and Trade 
Integration 
 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
L1. Bank. Int. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.1905 0.1497 0.1558 0.2323 0.1734 0.1358
1.32 1.45 1.43 1.20 1.37 1.50
GDP & Population Controls no yes yes no yes yes
EU & EUROZONE dummies no no yes no no yes
Country-Pair Time Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Pair FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Within-R2 0.7925 0.8019 0.8042 0.8361 0.8407 0.8419
N 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546
Trade Integration
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Note: The table presents OLS estimates. The sample period is 1994-2006. Intensive margin is presented in columns 1-3, which is
defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is
presented in columns 4-6, which is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Banking 
Integration (BankInt) is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets and liabilities
holdings (stocks). Control variables include the log of the product GDP per capita, the log of the product population and indicator
variables for Eurozone and EU membership. All variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair
level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics are reported below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
L1. Harmon. -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
0.3207 0.6522 0.6549 0.2109 0.6384 0.425
-1.00 -0.45 -0.45 -1.26 -0.47 -0.80
GDP & Population Controls no yes yes no yes yes
EU & EUROZONE dummies no no yes no no yes
Country-Pair Time Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Pair FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Within-R2 0.7917 0.8006 0.8029 0.836 0.8403 0.8414
N 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546
Note: The table presents OLS estimates. The sample period is 1994-2006. Intensive margin is presented in columns 1-3, which is
defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is
presented in columns 4-6, which is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Regulatory 
Harmonization (Harmon) is a country-pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in European
Union, which is constructed as the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU Directive of the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the earliest date. Control variables include the log of the product
GDP per capita, the log of the product population and indicator variables for Eurozone and EU membership. All variables are
lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics are reported
below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Trade Integration
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
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4.3 Heterogeneous Effects 
Having established no meaningful relationship 
between banking and trade integration at the aggregate 
level, we now explore the idea that there might be winners 
and losers from financial globalization at the industry level. 
Building on Fisman and Love (2004, 2007), we study 
heterogeneous effects based on industry's growth 
opportunities. As Fisman and Love (2007) discuss, the 
assumptions of the highly influential work of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) are related more to an industry's response 
to global shocks rather than to inherent (technological) 
financial dependence. Unlike Fisman and Love’s (2004) 
growth opportunities proxy that does not vary over time, 
we construct a time-varying measure, because growth 
opportunities that arise from global shocks are likely to be 
temporal rather than permanent70.  
We start by exploring the relationship between our 
harmonization index and trade integration. We present the 
intensive margin results in columns 1-3 of Table 3.5. The 
variable of interest in column 1 is the interaction between 
harmonization and growth opportunities. Along with 
standard macroeconomic variables and dummies for EU 
                                               
70 To maximize the coverage of industries, we employ the 
NBER Manufacturing Database to get information for 387 
industries as compared to Compustat that leaves us with 
approximately 200 industries at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. 
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and Eurozone membership, we control for an extensive set 
of year and country-pair-industry dummies. The rationale 
for the latter is to account for the hard-to-measure country-
pair-specific comparative advantage in international trade. 
The estimated effect is positive, highly statistically 
significant (at the 99%) and highly economically relevant 
(0.23). In addition, the level effect of financial 
harmonization enters also positive and statistically 
significant. In column 2, we add country-pair-year fixed 
effects and, as such, we absorb the level effect and all 
macroeconomic variables. We find no change in the 
estimated effect of the interaction variable. Finally, in 
column 3, we add a set of industry-time dummies. This 
very restrictive specification with an exhaustive set of fixed 
effects suggests that industries in the upper percentile of the 
distribution of growth opportunities benefit more from the 
regulatory harmonization as compared to industries in the 
lower percentile of the distribution. Columns 4-6) focus on 
the extensive margin. Regardless of how we saturate the 
model, we find that regulatory harmonization is associated 
with an increase in the number of products that are traded 
in industries that are relatively more responsive to global 
shocks.  
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneous Effects: Harmonization and 
Trade Integration 
 
 
In Table 3.6, we present the estimated effect of 
our de-facto measure of banking integration on trade 
integration. We eliminate concerns regarding reverse 
causation by considering variables that are lagged one year. 
All models control for hard-to-measure country-pair-
specific comparative advantage in international trade with 
an extensive set of country-pair-industry dummies. Then, 
we gradually saturate with fixed effects to isolate the 
heterogeneous effect of banking integration across 
industries on trade integration. At the intensive margin 
(columns 1-3), we document a strong association between 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
L1. Harmon. x GrOpp 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.03***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0075 0.0098 0.0311 0.0001
5.74 6.32 2.72 2.62 2.18 4.15
L1. Harmon. 0.05*** 0.00                 
0.0002 0.1666                 
3.86 -1.39                 
L1. GrOpp 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00                 
0.92 0.64 0.62 0.86                 
0.10 -0.47 -0.50 -0.18                 
GDP & Population Controls yes no no yes no no
EU & EUROZONE dummies yes no no yes no no
Year FE yes no no yes no no
Country-Pair-Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Pair-Year FE no yes yes no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no no yes no no yes
Within-R2 0.0045 0.0008 0.0001 0.0088 0.0001 0.0002
N 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849
Trade Integration
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Note: The table presents OLS estimates. The sample period is 1994-2006. Intensive margin is presented in columns 1-3, which is
defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is
presented in columns 4-6, which is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Regulatory 
Harmonization (Harmon) is a country-pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in European
Union, which is constructed as the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU Directive of the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the earliest date. Growth Opportunities (GrOpp) is the annual sales
growth of an industry and is constructed from the NBER Manufacturing Database at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. Control variables
include the log of the product GDP per capita, the log of the product population and indicator variables for Eurozone and EU
membership. All variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are double clustered at the country-pair and industry-time level and
corresponding p-values and t-statistics are reported below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01,
**p< 0.05, *p<0.1.
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banking and trade integration for industries that are highly 
responsive to global shocks. Based on the most restrictive 
specification, the estimated elasticity is 0.04, which implies 
that trade integration is 1.6pp per year higher in industries 
with relatively greater growth differential (i.e. 75th – 25th 
percentiles) for high levels of bilateral banking integration 
(i.e. 75th percentile) as compared to low levels of bilateral 
banking integration (i.e. 25th percentile). We obtain an 
equally strong correlation between banking and trade 
integration at the extensive margin of trade. Regardless of 
how we saturate the model, the effect is highly statistically 
significant suggesting that greater bilateral financial 
linkages are associated with mode products being traded in 
industries with higher growth opportunities.   
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneous Effects: Banking and Trade 
Integration 
 
Having established a significant relationship 
between our index of regulatory harmonization and trade 
integration and our de-facto measure of banking integration 
and trade integration, we now combine the two in an IV 
setup. This allows us to establish the causal effect of 
banking integration on trade integration and eliminate 
concerns regarding reverse causation as theory predicts. 
Columns 1-3 of Table 3.7 report a highly statistically 
significant and economically relevant effect at the intensive 
margin. The strictest of our specifications (column 3) 
suggests a 5.7pp per year trade effect of high versus low 
bilateral banking integration in industries at the 75th 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
L1. Bank. Int. x GrOpp 0.01 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00***
0.1200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0235 0.0092
1.56 5.15 4.44 7.02 2.29 2.64
L1. Bank. Int. 0.01 -0.01*                 
0.6081 0.0634                 
0.51 -1.87                 
L1. GrOpp -0.01 -0.25*** -0.10*** -0.02                 
0.88 0.00 0.00 0.12                 
-0.15 -3.25 -5.90 -1.55                 
GDP & Population Controls yes no no yes no no
EU & EUROZONE dummies yes no no yes no no
Year FE yes no no yes no no
Country-Pair-Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Pair-Year FE no yes yes no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no no yes no no yes
Within-R2 0.0032 0.0003 0.0001 0.0096 0.0000 0.0001
N 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849
Trade Integration
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Note: The table presents OLS estimates. The sample period is 1994-2006. Intensive margin is presented in columns 1-3, which is
defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is
presented in columns 4-6, which is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Banking 
Integration (BankInt) is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets and liabilities
holdings (stocks). Growth Opportunities (GrOpp) is the annual sales growth of an industry and is constructed from the NBER
Manufacturing Database at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. Control variables include the log of the product GDP per capita, the log of
the product population and indicator variables for Eurozone and EU membership. All variables are lagged one year. Standard
errors are double clustered at the country-pair and industry-time level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics are reported
below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
L1. Bank. Int. x GrOpp 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.14** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03***
0.0001 0.0000 0.0139 0.0237 0.0401 0.001
4.15 4.34 2.49 2.29 2.07 3.38
L1. Bank. Int. 0.41** -0.04                 
0.0231 0.1696                 
2.30 -1.38                 
L1. GrOpp -2.82*** -3.02*** -0.17** -0.15**                 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05                 
-3.95 -4.14 -2.23 -2.01                 
GDP & Population Controls yes no no yes no no
EU & EUROZONE dummies yes no no yes no no
Year FE yes no no yes no no
Country-Pair-Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Pair-Year FE no yes yes no yes yes
Industry-Year FE no no yes no no yes
N 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849
Trade Integration
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Note: The table presents IV estimates. The sample period is 1994-2006. Intensive margin is presented in columns 1-3, which is
defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is
presented in columns 4-6, which is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Banking
Integration (BankInt) is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets and liabilities
holdings (stocks). Banking integration is instrumented with a country-pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial
intermediation in European Union, which is constructed as the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU
Directive of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the earliest date. Growth Opportunities
(GrOpp) is the annual sales growth of an industry and is constructed from the NBER Manufacturing Database at the 4-digit SIC
1987 level. Control variables include the log of the product GDP per capita, the log of the product population and indicator
variables for Eurozone and EU membership. All variables are lagged one year. Standard errors are double clustered at the country-
pair and industry-time level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics are reported below the estimates. Statistical significance is
denoted as follows ***p<0.01, **p< 0.05, *p<0.1.
percentile as compared to industries at the 25th percentile. 
We document string positive effects at the extensive margin 
as well with the elasticity at the strictest specification being 
statistically significant at the 99%. Economically, it 
suggests that trade integration is 1.2pp per year higher in 
industries with relatively greater growth differential for 
high levels of bilateral banking integration (i.e.  75th 
percentile) as compared to low levels of bilateral banking 
integration (i.e. 25th percentile). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that banking integration has a strong 
positive effect on trade integration with the benefits being 
distributed unequally across industries. Industries that 
respond relatively stringer to global shocks tend to benefit 
more from increased international financial linkages and 
this holds for both intensive and extensive margins of trade.  
Table 3.7: Heterogeneous Effects IV Estimates: 
Banking and Trade Integration 
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5. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we perform additional tests to 
check the robustness of our findings. Since our analysis 
points to the distributional, rather than aggregate, impact of 
banking integration across industries, we check the 
robustness of heterogeneous effects. In Table 8, we include 
the interactions of regulatory harmonization and banking 
integration with the factors of production, namely capital 
and skills intensity. As with the growth opportunities, we 
employ the NBER Manufacturing Database and construct 
capital and skills intensity measures that vary over time at 
the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. The idea behind this exercise is 
that our baseline estimates of growth opportunities might 
be biased in case capital and skills intensive industries are 
differentially affected by greater regulatory harmonization 
and banking integration. We start by presenting reduced-
form OLS estimates (i.e. harmonization on trade 
integration) and benchmark OLS estimates (i.e. de-facto 
banking integration on trade integration) and, finally, we 
combine the two in an instrumental variables setup. As 
columns 1-3 of Table 3.8 report, our conclusions remain 
unchanged regarding the intensive margin of trade. Across 
all specifications, the effect is statistically significant and 
the economic magnitude is also meaningful. The estimated 
coefficient (0.11) implies that trade integration is 3.9pp per 
year higher in industries with relatively greater growth 
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differential for high levels of bilateral banking integration 
(i.e. 75th percentile) as compared to low levels of bilateral 
banking integration (i.e. 25th percentile). Our conclusions 
remain unchanged for the extensive margin of trade as well. 
Based on IV estimates (column 6), an estimated effect of 
0.04 implies that the cross-country-pair difference between 
the growth differentials is 1.6pp per year. These results 
confirm our findings of the positive trade effect of banking 
integration in industries that are relatively more responsive 
to global shocks.  
Table 3.8: Robustness Test I: Controlling for Factor 
Intensities 
 
In Table 3.9, we consider an alternative time 
window and restrict our attention in period 1999-2006. We 
Reduced-Form OLS IV Reduced-Form OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
L1. Harmon. x GrOpp 0.12*** 0.03***                
0.0024 0.0000                
3.1 4.26                
L1. Bank. Int. x GrOpp 0.03*** 0.11* 0.00 0.04***
0.0003 0.086 0.1563 0.0011
3.7 1.73 1.43 3.33
L1. Harmon. x CapInt/Skills yes no no yes no no
L1. Bank. Int. x CapInt/Skills no yes yes no yes yes
Country-Pair-Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Pair-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Within-R2 0.0004 0.0002 - 0.0003 0.0004 -
N 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849
Trade Integration
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Note: The table presents OLS and IV estimates. The sample period is 1994-2006. Intensive margin is presented in columns 1-3, which is
defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is presented in
columns 4-6, which is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Regulatory Harmonization (Harmon) is a
country-pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in European Union, which is constructed as the log of one
plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU Directive of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at
the earliest date. Banking Integration (BankInt) is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets
and liabilities holdings (stocks). In columns 3 and 6, banking integration is instrumented with regulatory harmonization. Growth Opportunities 
(GrOpp) is the annual sales growth of an industry, Capital Intensity (CapInt) is the log of the real capital stock to total employment of an
industry and Skills Intensity (Skills) is one minus the share of production employment to total employment of an industry. All measures are
time-varying and are constructed from the NBER Manufacturing Database at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. All variables are lagged one year.
Standard errors are double clustered at the country-pair and industry-time level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics are reported below
the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01, **p <0.05, *p< 0.1.
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motivate this exercise by the fact that regulatory 
harmonization was initiated in 1999. We re-run our 
baseline regressions for all three models for both margins 
of trade, in other words we obtain reduced-form OLS and 
benchmark estimates as well as IV estimates. Across all 
specifications (columns 1-3 for the intensive and columns 
4-6 for the extensive margin), the statistical significance of 
the estimated effect is retained. Economically, although the 
magnitude is somewhat smaller, our elasticities suggest that 
the trade effect of bilateral financial linkages across 
industries with differential growth opportunities remains 
meaningful. As a result, despite the time window 
considered for the analysis, our conclusions remain 
unchanged.    
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Table 3.9: Robustness Test II: Alternative Time Window 
 
6. The Role of Common Currency 
In the final section, we turn our attention to the 
role of common currency. The financial integration effect 
of the euro has been documented in the literature and is 
mainly associated with the elimination of currency risk 
(e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro, 2010). The 
trade effect of the euro has also been discussed extensively 
in the literature (e.g. Baldwin, 2006). Here, we ask whether 
there is a differential effect of higher financial integration 
on trade between country-pairs that belong to the same 
monetary union as compared to country-pairs where at least 
one of the two countries is not part of the union. To put it 
differently, we ask whether eliminating the currency risk 
has any materially differential impact on the effects of 
greater financial linkages on international trade. And, if so, 
Reduced-Form OLS IV Reduced-Form OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
L1. Harmon. x GrOpp 0.07** 0.02***                  
0.0218 0.0001                  
2.32 3.92                  
L1. Bank. Int. x GrOpp 0.03*** 0.10** 0.00* 0.02***
0.0017 0.0307 0.0898 0.0023
3.21 2.18 1.71 3.11
Country-Pair-Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Pair-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Within-R2 0.0004 0.0002 - 0.0003 0.0004 -
N 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849 545,849
Trade Integration
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Note: The table presents OLS and IV estimates. The sample period is 1999-2006. Intensive margin is presented in columns 1-3, which
is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is
presented in columns 4-6, which is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Regulatory 
Harmonization (Harmon) is a country-pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in European Union,
which is constructed as the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU Directive of the Financial Services Action
Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the earliest date. Banking Integration (BankInt) is defined as the average of the logs of
bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets and liabilities holdings (stocks). In columns 3 and 6, banking integration is
instrumented with regulatory harmonization. Growth Opportunities (GrOpp) is the annual sales growth of an industry and is
constructed from the NBER Manufacturing Database at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. All variables are lagged one year. Standard errors
are double clustered at the country-pair and industry-time level and corresponding p-values and t-statistics are reported below the
estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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we ask whether the impact differs along the margins of 
trade. To this end, we interact our de-facto banking 
integration measure with an industry's growth opportunities 
with an indicator variable that is equal to one if both 
countries in a pair are members of the Eurozone, zero 
otherwise and we instrument with the triple interaction of 
harmonization with an industry's growth opportunities with 
the Eurozone indicator variable. Table 3.10 presents our 
estimated elasticities. As we report in column 1, conditional 
on all fixed effects, there is no differential effect at the 
intensive margin of trade. The interaction of banking 
integration with an industry's growth opportunities 
continues to enter significant and of the same magnitude as 
our baseline estimates. In contrast, when we estimate the 
extensive margin of trade, we find that the trade effect of 
banking integration in industries that grow relatively faster 
is more pronounced between country-pairs that belong to 
the Eurozone. The level effect of banking integration with 
an industry's growth opportunities continues to enter 
statistically significant. These results suggest that the euro 
along with the increased banking integration that stems 
from harmonization of financial intermediation in Europe 
had led to an increase in the number of products being 
traded in industries that are highly responsive to global 
shocks. Economically, as compared to non-Eurozone 
country-pairs, trade integration is 3.6pp per year higher in 
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industries with relatively greater growth differential for 
high levels of bilateral banking integration (i.e. 75th 
percentile) as compared to low levels of bilateral banking 
integration (i.e. 25th percentile).    
 
7. Conclusion 
 In this paper we provide causal evidence on the 
aggregate effect of banking integration on trade integration 
and explore the channels of transmission based on different 
industry characteristics. We update and expand an 
exogenous index of regulatory harmonization of financial 
services that was part of the Financial Services Action Plan 
in the EU in period 1999-2003. FSAP was a set of reforms 
in banking, insurance and securities markets, which 
harmonized EU member states’ financial regulation, 
integrated financial markets and reduced the costs of cross-
border financial intermediation. Exploiting the piecemeal 
transposition of EU-Directives into national law at the 
country-pair-year level, we find that bilateral banking 
integration does not cause greater bilateral trade. However, 
we document statistically and economically significant 
heterogeneous effects across industries with different 
responsiveness to global shocks. In other words, industries 
that grow faster benefit more in terms of trade at higher 
levels of bilateral banking integration as compared to 
industries that grow slower. Our findings suggest that the 
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benefits of financial globalization are not evenly distributed 
across industries, as some industries win and some 
industries lose from greater financial globalization. Overall, 
despite recent evidence on the transmission of local shocks 
globally through international financial linkages, our 
findings suggest that financial globalization has important 
positive effects on trade integration (Obstfeld, 2015).   
 
Table 3.10: The Role of Common Currency 
 
 
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
[1] [2]
L1. Bank. Int. x GrOpp x EUROboth 0.3 0.09** 
0.1438 0.0163
1.47 2.43
L1. Bank. Int. x GrOpp 0.11* 0.02** 
0.0546 0.0205
1.94 2.35
L1. EUROboth x GrOpp -2.55 -0.77** 
0.1504 0.0189
-1.45 -2.38
Country-Pair-Industry FE yes yes
Country-Pair-Year FE yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes
N 545,849 545,849
Trade Integration
Note: The table presents IV estimates. The sample period is 1994-2006. Intensive margin is
presented in column 1, which is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the
US price deflator) exports and imports. Extensive margin is presented in column 2, which is defined
as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported. Banking Integration (BankInt)
is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets and
liabilities holdings (stocks). Banking integration is instrumented with a country-pair time-varying
measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in European Union, which is constructed as
the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU Directive of the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP) transposed into national law at the earliest date. Growth Opportunities
(GrOpp) is the annual sales growth of an industry and is constructed from the NBER Manufacturing
Database at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level. EUROboth is an indicator variable that is equal to one if both
countries belong to the Eurozone, zero otherwise. All variables are lagged one year. Standard errors
are double clustered at the country-pair and industry-time level and corresponding p-values and t-
statistics are reported below the estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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C Appendix 
 
C.1 Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Observations Mean Min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max SD
Panel A: Aggregate Effects
Trade (Intensive Margin) 1546 21.43 17.3 19.45 20.3 21.44 22.44 23.53 24.92 1.5
Trade (Extensive Margin) 1546 7.54 5.59 6.72 7.19 7.62 7.98 8.23 8.37 0.57
Banking Integration 1546 7.72 0.69 4.74 6.12 7.82 9.52 10.54 12.88 2.26
Regulatory Harmonization 1546 0.6 0 0 0 0 0.69 2.71 3.14 1
Panel B: Heterogeneous Effects
Trade (Intensive Margin) 545849 13.27 0.66 9.62 11.34 13.34 15.27 16.82 22.71 2.77
Trade (Extensive Margin) 545849 1.6 0.69 0.69 0.97 1.45 2.08 2.68 5.25 0.77
Banking Integration 545849 7.84 0.69 4.84 6.27 7.93 9.63 10.58 12.88 2.22
Regulatory Harmonization 545849 0.62 0 0 0 0 0.69 2.71 3.14 1.01
Growth Opportunities 545849 -0.01 -0.37 -0.14 -0.06 0 0.06 0.11 0.29 0.11
Note: Panel A reports summary statistics at the country level (aggregate effects). Panel B reports summary statistics at the industry
level (heterogeneous effects). Trade (Intensive Margin) is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price
deflator) exports and imports. Trade (Extensive Margin) is defined as the average of the logs of goods bilaterally exported and imported.
Banking Integration is defined as the average of the logs of bilateral real (deflated with the US price deflator) assets and liabilities
holdings (stocks). Regulatory Harmonization is a country-pair time-varying measure of the harmonization of financial intermediation in
European Union, which is constructed as the log of one plus the sum of 27 indicator variables, one for each EU Directive of the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP). Growth Opportunities is the annual sales growth of an industry and is constructed from the NBER
Manufacturing Database at the 4-digit SIC 1987 level.
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 C
.2 
Earliest Transposition D
ates 
Directive Minimal AT BE DE DK ES FR FI GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter
1998/26/EC 0 1999 Q4 1999 Q2 1999 Q4 2000 Q2 1999 Q4 2001 Q2 1999 Q4 2000 Q1 1999 Q1 2001 Q2 2001 Q1 1999 Q1 2000 Q1 2000 Q1 1999 Q4
2000/46/EC 1 2002 Q2 2003 Q1 2002 Q3 2005 Q1 2002 Q4 2003 Q1 2003 Q1 2003 Q2 2002 Q2 2002 Q2 2002 Q2 2002 Q3 2002 Q1 2002 Q2 2002 Q2
2000/64/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q1 2002 Q1 2004 Q1 2002 Q4 2004 Q4 2004 Q2 2004 Q4 Not Yet Not Yet 2001 Q3 2003 Q1 2000 Q4 2000 Q3 2001 Q2
2001/17/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q4 2003 Q4 2006 Q3 2003 Q4 2004 Q2 2004 Q2 Not Yet 2003 Q2 2003 Q2 2004 Q2 2004 Q2 2003 Q2 2006 Q1 2003 Q2
2001/24/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2005 Q2 2004 Q4 2004 Q2 2006 Q2 2004 Q2 2004 Q3 2004 Q2 2005 Q2 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2004 Q2
2001/65/EC 1 2004 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q4 2002 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2006 Q2 2004 Q4 2005 Q1 2006 Q2 2005 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2004 Q4
2001/86/EC 1 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2004 Q2 2006 Q4 2005 Q3 2004 Q4 2006 Q2 2006 Q4 2005 Q4 2006 Q3 2005 Q2 2005 Q4 2004 Q3 2004 Q4
2001/97/EC 1 2003 Q2 2004 Q1 2002 Q3 2005 Q1 2003 Q3 2004 Q1 2003 Q2 2005 Q4 2003 Q2 2004 Q1 2004 Q4 2001 Q4 2004 Q2 1999 Q3 2004 Q2
2001/107/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1
2001/108/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1
2002/13/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q1
2002/47/EC 1 2003 Q4 2005 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2002 Q4 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q3 2005 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q2 2005 Q2 2003 Q4
2002/65/EC 0 2004 Q4 2006 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2007 Q4 2005 Q2 2005 Q2 2005 Q2 2004 Q4 2005 Q4 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2006 Q2 2002 Q3 2004 Q4
2002/87/EC 1 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q3 2005 Q2 2004 Q4 2004 Q3 2006 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q3 2006 Q4 2007 Q1 2006 Q3 2006 Q3 2004 Q3
2002/83/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2005 Q1
2002/92/EC 1 2004 Q4 2005 Q1 2007 Q2 2005 Q3 2006 Q3 2005 Q4 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2006 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2006 Q4 2005 Q3 2004 Q4
2003/6/EC 1 2005 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q4 2005 Q2 2005 Q4 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q2 2006 Q2 2005 Q4 2006 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q3
2003/41/EC 1 2005 Q3 2006 Q4 2005 Q3 2005 Q4 2005 Q1 2006 Q2 2006 Q2 2002 Q3 2005 Q3 2007 Q1 2005 Q3 2006 Q2 2006 Q1 2005 Q1 2005 Q4
2003/48/EC 1 2004 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2005 Q1 2003 Q4 2005 Q2 2005 Q2 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2005 Q1
2003/51/EC 1 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2006 Q3 2005 Q1 2007 Q2 2006 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q4
2003/71/EC 0 2005 Q3 2006 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q4 2005 Q3 2007 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2006 Q1 2004 Q2 2005 Q3
2004/25/EC 1 2006 Q2 2007 Q3 2006 Q3 2005 Q2 2007 Q3 2006 Q2 2006 Q4 2006 Q2 2006 Q2 2007 Q4 2006 Q2 2007 Q4 2006 Q4 2006 Q3 2006 Q2
2004/109/EC 1 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q2 2007 Q2 2007 Q4 2008 Q3 Not Yet 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4
2004/39/EC 0 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q2 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q1
2005/56/EC 1 2007 Q4 2008 Q3 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 Not Yet 2008 Q3 2007 Q4 Not Yet 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 Not Yet 2008 Q3 Not Yet 2008 Q1 2007 Q4
2006/48/EC 1 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q1
2006/49/EC 1 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q1
The table reports the earliest year and quarter of the implementation of each of the 27 Directives of the FSAP by EU15 countries. Dummy minnimal refers to Directives that imply minimal harmonization into national laws (see Enriques and Gatti (2008)). Source: EU Commission, EU Law database (EUR-LEX) and each of the EU15 countries.
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 C
.3 
Latest Transposition D
ates 
  
Directive Minimal AT BE DE DK ES FR FI GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter year quarter
1998/26/EC 0 1999 Q4 1999 Q2 1999 Q4 2000 Q2 1999 Q4 2001 Q2 1999 Q4 2000 Q1 1999 Q1 2001 Q2 2001 Q1 1999 Q1 2000 Q1 2000 Q1 1999 Q4
2000/46/EC 1 2002 Q2 2003 Q2 2002 Q3 2005 Q1 2002 Q4 2003 Q1 2003 Q1 2003 Q2 2002 Q2 2002 Q2 2002 Q2 2002 Q3 2002 Q1 2002 Q2 2002 Q2
2000/64/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q1 2002 Q4 2006 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q4 Not Yet Not Yet 2004 Q2 2003 Q1 2002 Q3 2000 Q3 2003 Q2
2001/17/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q4 2003 Q4 2006 Q3 2003 Q4 2005 Q1 2004 Q2 Not Yet 2003 Q2 2003 Q2 2004 Q2 2004 Q2 2003 Q2 2006 Q1 2005 Q3
2001/24/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2005 Q2 2004 Q4 2004 Q2 2006 Q2 2004 Q2 2004 Q3 2004 Q2 2005 Q2 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2004 Q2
2001/65/EC 1 2004 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q4 2002 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2006 Q2 2004 Q4 2005 Q1 2006 Q2 2005 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2004 Q4
2001/86/EC 1 2004 Q4 2006 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q2 2006 Q4 2005 Q3 2004 Q4 2006 Q2 2006 Q4 2005 Q4 2006 Q3 2005 Q2 2005 Q4 2004 Q3 2004 Q4
2001/97/EC 1 2003 Q2 2004 Q1 2002 Q3 2005 Q1 2003 Q3 2006 Q2 2003 Q2 2005 Q4 2003 Q3 2006 Q1 2004 Q4 2001 Q4 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2004 Q2
2001/107/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2005 Q4 2004 Q1 2003 Q4 2004 Q2 2004 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1
2001/108/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q1 2003 Q4 2004 Q2 2004 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2003 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1
2002/13/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q1
2002/47/EC 1 2003 Q4 2005 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2002 Q4 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q1 2004 Q3 2005 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q2 2005 Q2 2003 Q4
2002/65/EC 0 2004 Q4 2006 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2007 Q4 2005 Q2 2005 Q2 2005 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q4 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2006 Q2 2004 Q2 2004 Q4
2002/87/EC 1 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q3 2005 Q2 2004 Q4 2004 Q3 2006 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q3 2006 Q4 2007 Q1 2006 Q3 2006 Q3 2004 Q3
2002/83/EC 1 2003 Q3 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2004 Q1 2004 Q2 2003 Q4 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2005 Q1
2002/92/EC 1 2004 Q4 2005 Q1 2007 Q2 2005 Q3 2006 Q3 2006 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2005 Q1 2006 Q2 2005 Q4 2005 Q3 2006 Q4 2005 Q3 2005 Q1
2003/6/EC 1 2005 Q1 2005 Q3 2004 Q4 2005 Q2 2005 Q4 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q2 2006 Q2 2005 Q4 2006 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q3
2003/41/EC 1 2005 Q3 2006 Q4 2005 Q3 2005 Q4 2005 Q1 2006 Q2 2006 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2007 Q1 2006 Q2 2006 Q2 2006 Q1 2006 Q1 2005 Q4
2003/48/EC 1 2004 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2004 Q2 2004 Q1 2003 Q4 2004 Q1 2005 Q1 2003 Q4 2005 Q2 2005 Q2 2004 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q1
2003/51/EC 1 2005 Q1 2006 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q2 2005 Q1 2004 Q4 2004 Q4 2006 Q3 2005 Q1 2007 Q2 2006 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q1 2006 Q1 2005 Q1
2003/71/EC 0 2005 Q3 2006 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q2 2005 Q1 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2005 Q4 2005 Q3 2007 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q3 2006 Q2 2006 Q1 2005 Q3
2004/25/EC 1 2006 Q2 2007 Q3 2006 Q3 2006 Q2 2007 Q3 2006 Q2 2006 Q4 2006 Q2 2006 Q2 2007 Q4 2006 Q2 2007 Q4 2006 Q4 2006 Q3 2006 Q2
2004/109/EC 1 2007 Q4 2008 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q2 2007 Q2 2007 Q4 2008 Q3 Not Yet 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4
2004/39/EC 0 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q2 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q1
2005/56/EC 1 2007 Q4 2008 Q3 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 Not Yet 2008 Q3 2007 Q4 Not Yet 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 Not Yet 2008 Q3 Not Yet 2008 Q1 2007 Q4
2006/48/EC 1 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q1
2006/49/EC 1 2007 Q4 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2008 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q1 2007 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q1
Appendix Table 3: Latest Transposition Dates
The table reports the latest year and quarter of the implementation of each of the 27 Directives of the FSAP by EU15 countries. Dummy minnimal refers to Directives that imply minimal harmonization into national laws (see Enriques and Gatti (2008)). Source: EU Commission, EU Law database (EUR-LEX) and each of the EU15 countries.
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